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ON THE SUPPOSED JURY-DEPENDENCE OF EVIDENCE LAW 
FREDERICK SCHAUER†
 
If there were no juries, would there be a law of evidence?  And 
should there be?  These questions are not about whether this or that 
rule of evidence owes its existence to the institution of the jury, and 
are thus not about whether particular evidence rules should be modi-
fied or eliminated when juries are not present.  Nor are they about 
those many rules of evidence that are premised on such wildly mis-
taken folk wisdom about jury behavior that they are in desperate need 
of modification or elimination in light of what we now know from the 
social sciences about how people in general and juries in particular 
actually decide and deliberate.  Rather, my question is whether the law 
of evidence, in the large, is so substantially a product of the institution 
of the jury itself that if juries did not exist, then vast swaths of evidence 
law would, and should, not exist as well. 
This question is not merely of academic or historical interest.  
Numerous American trial judges, echoing what scholars since Jeremy 
Bentham have urged,1 essentially discard large chunks of the law of 
evidence when they sit without a jury.2  Time and again, especially in 
civil litigation and more than occasionally even in criminal cases, ob-
jections to the admissibility of evidence are met with the judicial re-
 † Frank Stanton Professor of the f irst Amendment, John F. Kennedy School of 
Government, Harvard University.  This Article was written while I had the honor of 
serving as the Daniel R. Fischel and Sylvia M. Neil Distinguished Visiting Professor of 
Law at the University of Chicago.  I am grateful for comments from Christopher Buc-
cafusco, Laird Kirkpatrick, Richard McAdams, Dale Nance, Eric Posner, Chaim Sai-
man, Matthew Stephenson, and William Twining; from the members of the Drafts 
Reading Group at the Harvard Law School; and from the participants in the Legal 
Theory Workshop at the University of Pennsylvania Law School and the Works in Pro-
gress Seminar at the University of Chicago Law School. 
1 See infra Part I. 
2 See, e.g., Barry C. Feld, The Juvenile Court Meets the Principle of the Offense:  Legislative 
Changes in Juvenile Waiver Statutes, 78 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 471, 477 (1987) (re-
counting departure from rules of evidence in juvenile proceedings); G. Michael Fen-
ner, The Forced Use of Inadmissible Hearsay Evidence in Bankruptcy Court, 8 AM. BANKR. 
INST. L. REV. 453, 476 (2000) (describing disregard of evidence rules in bankruptcy 
trials); A. Leo Levin & Harold K. Cohen, The Exclusionary Rules in Nonjury Criminal 
Cases, 119 U. PA. L. REV. 905, 908 (1971) (urging off icial recognition of widespread 
practice of ignoring rules of evidence in nonjury cases). 
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sponse of, “I’ll let it in and just give it the weight it deserves.”3  Be-
cause most of the rules of evidence are essentially exclusionary, and 
because judges (like the rest of us) do not want to screen themselves 
off from potentially useful information, many judges persistently treat 
the law of evidence as a counterproductive encumbrance to be jetti-
soned whenever possible.  Indeed, there are frequent calls in the aca-
demic literature to make formally and legally permissible what all ac-
knowledge to be the widespread informal practice.4
But are these trial judges and their academic forebears right?  Is 
the law of evidence, which owes an appreciable part of its provenance 
to a concern about the cognitive or decision-making capacities of ju-
rors,5 appropriately limited to the circumstances of its birth?  When 
3 “[ J]udges presiding at non-jury trials often admit evidence indiscriminately, rul-
ing on weight and relevance only after all the facts have been presented.”  Liana Gioia 
Per Ramfjord, Note, Reforming At-Will Employment Law:  A Model Statute, 16 U. MICH. J.L. 
REFORM 389, 426 (1983).  For judicial acknowledgment and endorsement of the prac-
tice, see, for example, State v. Stout, 46 S.W.3d 689, 703 (Tenn. 2001) (adopting princi-
ple that trial judges should have “wider discretion than would normally be allowed un-
der the [state’s] Rules of Evidence” (quoting State v. Sims, 45 S.W.3d 1, 14 (Tenn. 
2001))); Commonwealth v. Irwin, 639 A.2d 52, 54-55 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1994) (noting that 
trial judge is presumed to be able to disregard prejudicial evidence).  In obvious frus-
tration with what it saw as a widespread practice, the Seventh Circuit found it necessary 
to note that “[t]he Federal Rules of Evidence are statutes, and district judges may not 
disregard statutes no matter how inconvenient or cumbersome they believe the rules 
to be.”  In re Oil Spill by the Amoco Cadiz off the Coast of France on March 16, 1978, 
954 F.2d 1279, 1305 (7th Cir. 1992); see also Mark I. Bernstein, Expert Testimony in Penn-
sylvania, 68 TEMP. L. REV. 699, 716 & n.110 (1995) (noting tendency of judges to ig-
nore rules of evidence regarding expert testimony in nonjury trials). 
4 See, e.g., James H. Chadbourn, Bentham and the Hearsay Rule—A Benthamic View of 
Rule 63(4)(c) of the Uniform Rules of Evidence, 75 HARV. L. REV. 932, 937 (1962) (present-
ing Bentham’s argument for eliminating hearsay rule in both jury and nonjury cases); 
Kenneth Culp Davis, An Approach to Rules of Evidence for Nonjury Cases, 50 A.B.A. J. 723 
(1964) (advocating distinct rules of evidence for nonjury trials); Peter L. Murray & 
John C. Sheldon, Should the Rules of Evidence be Modified for Civil Non-Jury Trials?, 17 ME. 
B.J. 30 (2002) (urging formal approval of relaxed rules of evidence in civil nonjury 
cases); John Sheldon & Peter Murray, Rethinking the Rules of Evidentiary Admissibility in 
Non-Jury Trials, 86 JUDICATURE 227, 231 (2003) (“[The role of t]he American law of 
evidentiary admissibility . . . in civil, non-jury proceedings is due for extinction.”). 
5 See CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, EVIDENCE § 1.1, at 2 (3d 
ed. 2003) (arguing that mistrust of juries is one of the primary reasons for evidence 
law); Henry M. Hart, Jr. & John T. McNaughton, Evidence and Inference in the Law, in 
EVIDENCE AND INFERENCE 48, 56 (Daniel Lerner ed., 1959) (discussing rules of evi-
dence “designed to exclude evidence to which the jury might give too much weight”); 
Edmund M. Morgan, The Jury and the Exclusionary Rules of Evidence, 4 U. CHI. L. REV. 
247, 255 (1937) (noting that judicial discussions of hearsay rule indicate a distrust of 
jury’s ability to handle such testimony).  For the argument that the existence of the 
jury was a necessary but not suff icient cause of the development of a comprehensive 
law of evidence, and that the development of the corpus of evidence law was a product 
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juries are removed from the picture, should much of the law of evi-
dence be removed as well?  Although rarely put in such stark terms, 
that conclusion reflects the conventional wisdom.6  Yet while this may 
be the conventional wisdom, my aim here is to ask whether the con-
ventional wisdom is correct and to suggest some reasons for believing 
that it is not. 
In asking this question about the foundations of evidence law, I 
take it as common ground that those rules of evidence serving extrinsic 
goals present almost wholly different issues from the ones I discuss 
here.  Privileges, for example, do not purport to serve epistemic 
goals,7 and even those judges and commentators who question the 
need for juror-free evidence law typically have little problem with ex-
cluding properly privileged evidence—such as confidential conversa-
tions between spouses8 or between lawyer and client9—even when ju-
ries are absent.  And so too with various other rules—such as the 
inadmissibility of evidence of subsequent repairs and other remedial 
of both the jury and the adversary system, see John H. Langbein, Historical Foundations 
of the Law of Evidence:  A View from the Ryder Sources, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 1168, 1201-02 
(1996).  For the view that the exclusion of hearsay predates Anglo-American fears 
about jury mistakes, see Frank R. Herrmann, The Establishment of a Rule Against Hearsay 
in Romano-Canonical Procedure, 36 VA. J. INT’L L. 1 (1995).  Cf. Crawford v. Washington, 
541 U.S. 36, 53-54 (2004) (connecting history of hearsay exclusion with history of the 
right to confront opposing witnesses). 
6 “[M]istrust of juries is the single overriding reason for the law of evidence.”  
CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, EVIDENCE UNDER THE RULES 1 
(5th ed. 2004).  The causal relationship between the institution of the jury and the en-
tirety of the law of evidence is also one of the principal themes explored in MIRJAN R. 
DAMASKA, EVIDENCE LAW ADRIFT 26-57 (1997), although Damaska also attributes the 
rise of the rules of evidence to other adversarial and procedural attributes of the com-
mon law approach to litigation, id. at 74-124.  For an extensive account of this conven-
tional “abolitionist” wisdom, see ALEX STEIN, FOUNDATIONS OF EVIDENCE LAW 108-16 
(2005). 
7 At least privileges do not typically serve the epistemic goals of the trial, although 
they may serve other epistemic goals, such as facilitating the production of knowledge 
in various out-of-court settings.  For example, exclusion of otherwise relevant informa-
tion communicated by a patient to a psychotherapist, see Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 
15 (1996), may keep relevant information out of a trial, but may foster the provision by 
the patient to the psychotherapist of information relevant to treatment. 
8 See, e.g., United States v. Estes, 793 F.2d 465, 468 (2d Cir. 1986) (recognizing 
marital conf idential communications privilege); People v. Daghita, 86 N.E.2d 172, 174 
(N.Y. 1949) (same). 
9 See, e.g., United States v. Ramirez, 608 F.2d 1261, 1268 n.12 (9th Cir. 1979) (sug-
gesting that privilege covers statements made both by lawyer and by client); United 
States v. Kovel, 296 F.2d 918, 922 (2d Cir. 1961) (holding that attorney-client privilege 
extends to communications with accountant assisting an attorney). 
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measures to prove negligence or other culpable conduct,10 of liability 
insurance,11 and of plea bargain12 and settlement negotiations13—that 
are designed to create the proper incentives for socially desirable out-
of-court conduct.  Such rules are the exception, however, and most of 
the exclusionary rules are designed with the jury in mind and with the 
goal of increasing the accuracy and efficiency of fact finding under 
circumstances of jury decision making.  In other words, they are (in-
ternally) epistemic and not extrinsic.  Such rules comprise the bulk of 
evidence law and furnish its guiding inspiration, and it is such rules 
that are so often assumed to be largely jury dependent.14  My aim here 
is to question this assumption, not in terms of its historical accuracy, 
but in terms of the goals that the rules of evidence might now be 
properly thought to serve. 
I.  THE SKEPTICAL TRADITION 
Interestingly, the entire law of evidence is a relatively modern 
creation.  Although the exclusion of hearsay and rudimentary cor-
roboration requirements are at least as old as the common law itself, 
the identification of evidence as a distinct legal realm and as a unified 
body of law postdates the law of, say, property, by at least several hun-
dred years.  There was no systematic attempt to compile the various 
bits and pieces of evidentiary rulings into a distinct topic until well 
into the eighteenth century.15  So when Jeremy Bentham launched his 
10 FED. R. EVID. 407. 
11 FED. R. EVID. 411. 
12 FED. R. EVID. 410. 
13 FED. R. EVID. 408. 
14 Even those who see the rules of evidence as a product of features of the com-
mon law adversarial system other than the presence of a jury, see DAMASKA, supra note 
6, at 75 (arguing that party control over evidence “affects the fundamentals of eviden-
tiary thought”), appear to be largely convinced that a rule-based and exclusionary ap-
proach to evidence is fundamentally misguided, id. at 142 (noting that decline of jury 
trials and weakening of the adversarial system may render evidentiary rules obsolete); 
see also Mirjan Damaska, Free Proof and Its Detractors, 43 AM. J. COMP. L. 343, 348-52 
(1995) (comparing effects of exclusionary rules in the Anglo-American and continen-
tal legal systems). 
15 The seminal work is SIR JEFFREY GILBERT, THE LAW OF EVIDENCE (London, 
Henry Lintot 1756) (1754).  Even more comprehensive was THOMAS PEAKE, A COM-
PENDIUM OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE (London, S. Rider 1801).  See generally T.P. Gallanis, 
The Rise of Modern Evidence Law, 84 IOWA L. REV. 499 (1999); A.D.E. Lewis, The Back-
ground to Bentham on Evidence, 2 UTILITAS 195, 202 (1990) (tracing beginnings of evi-
dence law to late seventeenth century and a “series of devices designed to widen the 
scope for the courts to interfere in the result arrived at by the jury”). 
SCHAUER PENNUMBRA.DOC 11/21/2006 3:57:21 PM 
2006] ON THE SUPPOSED JURY-DEPENDENCE OF EVIDENCE LAW 169 
 
attack on virtually the whole idea of evidence law in the early nine-
teenth century,16 it is fair to say that he was trying to nip what he saw 
as a dangerous weed in the bud, as opposed to attempting to disman-
tle a long-standing edifice.17
Bentham is of particular interest to us because he framed the issue 
in a way that leaves no doubt about what is at stake.  For Bentham, the 
rules of evidence—almost all of them—were needless and often 
suboptimizing distractions.  The ideal system, he proposed, was one of 
“free proof,” an approach, to oversimplify only slightly, in which evi-
dence was admitted if logically relevant—if the consideration of some 
piece of evidence made a proposition more or less likely than it would 
have been without that evidence—and was then given the weight that 
its intrinsic and particular probative value justified.18  Thus, courts 
would proceed just as ordinary people proceeded when using their 
common sense to make everyday factual determinations.19  In making 
ordinary nonjudicial factual determinations, people do not, insisted 
Bentham, make use of artificial rules of exclusion or need special 
rules of corroboration for entire classes of events.  And thus there was 
no justification for the law to do otherwise.  Free Proof, for Bentham 
and his followers, was simply ordinary epistemology applied to legal 
matters,20 and that is why Bentham favorably compared what he la-
16 JEREMY BENTHAM, RATIONALE OF JUDICIAL EVIDENCE ( John S. Mill ed., Fred B. 
Rothman & Co 1995) (1827).  Especially noteworthy is Bentham’s claim that “[a]lmost 
every rule that has ever been laid down on the subject of evidence” is “repugnant to 
the ends of justice.” 1 BENTHAM, supra, at 4.  For extensive discussion, see WILLIAM 
TWINING, THEORIES OF EVIDENCE:  BENTHAM AND WIGMORE (1985); Lewis, supra note 
15, at 203-16.  For the view that Bentham’s critique of the exclusionary rules of evi-
dence may be somewhat narrower than is commonly supposed, see Dale A. Nance, The 
Best Evidence Principle, 73 IOWA L. REV. 227, 275 (1988). 
17 Thus, as late as 1794, Edmund Burke observed, at the trial of Warren Hastings, 
that the law of evidence was “comprised in so small a compass that a parrot . . . might 
get them by rote in one half-hour and repeat them in f ive minutes.”  WILLIAM TWIN-
ING, RETHINKING EVIDENCE:  EXPLORATORY ESSAYS 37 (Cambridge Univ. Press 2d ed. 
2006) (1990). 
18 Id. at 209 (stating that Bentham’s notion of Free Proof allowed for no restric-
tions other than the “general principles of practical reason”). 
19 “A large class of ‘exclusionary’ rules bars certain types of evidence from reach-
ing the trier of fact, though these same types of evidence would cheerfully and blithely 
be regarded as probative in everyday life.”  ALVIN I. GOLDMAN, KNOWLEDGE IN A SO-
CIAL WORLD 291 (1999). 
20 See Susan Haack, Epistemology Legalized:  Or, Truth, Justice, and the American Way, 
49 AM. J. JURIS. 43, 56 (2004) (“[T]hat exclusionary rules are inherently at odds with 
the epistemological desideratum of completeness. . . . is the main theme of Bentham’s 
treatise on evidence . . . .”). 
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beled the Natural System to its obvious (at least to him) inferior, the 
Technical System.21
Although Bentham’s views did not carry the day in undiluted 
form, they have been profoundly influential, if only to put on the 
permanent defensive anyone who might dare to think that there 
ought to be rules of evidence—especially nondefeasible exclusionary 
rules, as opposed to general but highly defeasible principles (or stan-
dards, if you will) of applied epistemology.22  And in the face of this 
shift in the burden of proof (another one of the rules that Bentham 
would have eliminated), a tradition developed of explaining the rise 
and continuation of the rules of evidence as being substantially the 
byproduct of the institution of the jury.  This was the signal contribu-
tion of James Bradley Thayer, who in 1898 in his A Preliminary Treatise 
on Evidence at the Common Law emphasized the essential narrowness of 
the exclusionary rules of evidence, urged that they be yet narrower 
still, and justified the ones that did and should remain as the conse-
quence either of principles of substantive (and not procedural) law or 
in order to take account of the likely failings of juries.23  For Thayer, 
and for many who followed him, it was the jury that was at the heart of 
understanding the essentially peculiar and often counterproductive 
institution of the law of evidence. 
Thayer’s impact has turned out to be less through his Treatise and 
more through his teaching and his students, the most prominent of 
21 See TWINING, supra note 16, at 48-51 (summarizing characteristics of Natural and 
Technical systems).  There is an important parallel here between Bentham’s view 
about the worth (or not) of rules of evidence and his view about the limited value of 
rules in general.  See GERALD J. POSTEMA, BENTHAM AND THE COMMON LAW TRADITION 
224-25 (1986).  Just as Bentham thought that rules were important for the public but 
less so, to put it mildly, for judges and lawmakers, so too did he think much the same 
thing about the rules of evidence.  But for a skeptical view of Bentham’s inf luence on 
subsequent evidence law, see C.J.W. ALLEN, THE LAW OF EVIDENCE IN VICTORIAN ENG-
LAND 7 (1997).  And for an account of Bentham’s view of rules that diverges in part 
from Postema’s, see John Dinwiddy, Bentham, in BENTHAM:  SELECTED WRITINGS OF 
JOHN DINWIDDY (William Twining ed., 2004). 
22 See Laird C. Kirkpatrick, Scholarly and Institutional Challenges to the Law of Evidence:  
From Bentham to the ADR Movement, 25 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 837, 847, 850 (1992) (describ-
ing Bentham’s preference for evidentiary principles rather than rules).  It is important 
to note that the issue is not whether the rules of evidence should be codif ied in some-
thing like the Federal Rules of Evidence or the California Evidence Code.  Rather, it is 
whether the admission or exclusion of evidence should be governed by rules at all, re-
gardless of whether those rules are common law rules or parts of comprehensive evi-
dence codes. 
23 JAMES BRADLEY THAYER, A PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE AT THE COMMON 
LAW 508-38 (Boston, Little, Brown & Co. 1898). 
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whom was John Henry Wigmore.  Wigmore is known primarily for his 
monumental and largely descriptive systematization of the law of evi-
dence,24 but he also had a prescriptive side.25  And when dealing not 
with what the law of evidence was, but instead about what it ought to 
be, Wigmore urged the development of a science of proof that was 
logically antecedent to the rules of evidence, and that would remain 
important even were the rules of admissibility—which he viewed as ar-
tificial—to be abolished.26  Certain fundamental principles underlying 
these artificial rules, insisted Wigmore, were highly important, but 
their importance was attributable almost entirely to the existence of 
the jury.27  Juries could hardly be trusted, Wigmore and many others 
believed, to apply the more scientific principles of proof directly to 
particular issues, and thus needed rules of evidence to steer them in 
the right direction.28  Such steering would not be necessary for legally 
24 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE,  EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW (Peter Tillers ed., 
1983). 
25 See TWINING, supra note 16, at 117 (describing Wigmore’s opposition to rigid 
rules; instead proposing that evidence rules should provide mere guidance). 
26 1 WIGMORE, supra note 24, § 8(c), at 630 (“A complete abolition of the rules in 
the future is at least arguable, not merely in theory but in realizable fact. . . . [I]n the 
United States . . . justice can be done without the orthodox rules of evidence.”). 
27 Id. § 8(c), at 632.
28 Id. at 632-33 (discussing “weaknesses” of jurors).  As I will develop at greater 
length in Part IV, there is an interesting parallel here to the literature on act- and rule-
utilitarianism.  Infra Part IV; see, e.g., J.J.C. Smart, Extreme and Restricted Utilitarianism, in 
CONTEMPORARY UTILITARIANISM 99 (Michael D. Bayles ed., 1968) (discussing opposing 
views in utilitarianism as to whether actors should follow rules or make moral judg-
ments on a case-by-case basis).  Most obviously to the point is R.M. Hare’s infelicitously 
labeled distinction in Moral Thinking:  Its Levels, Method and Point between “archangels” 
and “proles.”  R.M. HARE, MORAL THINKING:  ITS LEVELS, METHODS, AND POINT 44-45 
(1981).  For Hare, direct application of the principles of utility was beyond the capaci-
ties of the proles even if not for the (more ideal than real) archangels, and so although 
the more-or-less mythical archangels might be entrusted with this responsibility, the 
more-or-less mythical proles should be given more mechanical rules which, when ap-
plied by them, would produce more utility than would be produced were the proles en-
trusted with direct application of utilitarian principles.  See id. at 46-47.  This idea, simi-
lar to John Stuart Mill’s argument in Utilitarianism for (falsely) teaching the 
importance of justice to ordinary people as a way of getting them to produce the 
maximum amount of utility, John Stuart Mill, Utilitarianism, in THE BASIC WRITINGS OF 
JOHN STUART MILL 233, 277-301 (Dale E. Miller ed., 2002), and similar to a number of 
arguments presented by Henry Sidgwick, HENRY SIDGWICK, THE METHODS OF ETHICS 
440-50 (7th ed. 1981) (discussing the utilitarian basis for rules of justice), is plainly 
relevant to the debates about juries and the rules of evidence.  In many of these de-
bates, judges—especially in the eyes of judges—are the archangels, and jurors are the 
proles.  So although jurors are thought not to be trusted to apply scientif ic and phi-
losophical principles of proof directly—hence the exclusionary rules of evidence—
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astute judges, however,29 and thus the view developed that the law of 
evidence, to the extent it was necessary at all, was necessary largely be-
cause of the cognitive and epistemic failings of juries. 
II.  EXIT THE JURY 
Were all, or even much, litigation to take place before a jury, ques-
tioning the jury-dependence of the bulk of evidence law might be of 
little more than academic or historical interest.  In fact, however, jury 
trials are very much the exception rather than the rule, and this be-
comes more and more true every day.  The positions of Bentham, 
Thayer, Wigmore, and others30 are thus increasingly important pre-
cisely because the jury has become an endangered institution world-
wide.  Even in the United States, the number of criminal and civil jury 
trials has declined substantially in recent years.31  And in every com-
mon law country outside the United States, the civil jury has for all 
practical purposes disappeared,32 with libel cases typically being virtu-
there would, under this view, be no reason not to allow judges to do so when the jury is 
removed from the picture. 
29 And, a fortiori, in those legal systems not employing juries as f inders of fact. 
30 See supra note 4; see also Charles T. McCormick, Tomorrow’s Law of Evidence, 24 
A.B.A.J. 507, 580-81 (1938) (questioning the value of exclusionary rules of evidence as 
the institution of trial by jury diminishes in signif icance). 
31 See Marc Galanter, The Vanishing Trial:  An Examination of Trials and Related Mat-
ters in Federal and State Courts, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 459, 462 tbl.1, 512 tbl.7 
(2001) (showing a decreasing rate of jury trials as a percentage of total trials over 
time); PATRICK WALKER & PRAGATI PATRICK, ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED 
STATES COURTS, TRENDS IN FIREARMS CASES FROM FISCAL YEAR 1989 THROUGH 1998, 
AND THE WORKLOAD IMPLICATIONS FOR THE U.S. DISTRICT COURTS (2000), 
www.uscourts.gov/f irearms/f irearms00.html (indicating that between 1989 and 1998, 
there was a thirty-eight percent decline in jury trials for all criminal offenses).  What 
the existing research shows is that the decline in jury trials is not attributable to a de-
cline in the number of trials, but that it is at least in part attributable to a decline in the 
proportion of jury trials within the domain of trials. 
32 See, e.g., JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN ET AL., THE CIVIL LAW TRADITION:  EUROPE, 
LATIN AMERICA, AND EAST ASIA 1014 (1994) (stating that in common law countries 
other than the United States, “the civil jury has been abolished”); RICHARD A. POSNER, 
THE FEDERAL COURTS:  CHALLENGE AND REFORM 193 n.1 (1996) (“[T]he abolition of 
the jury in civil cases [is] a course that the rest of the civilized world took long 
ago . . . .”); KONRAD ZWEIGERT & HEIN KOTZ, AN INTRODUCTION TO COMPARATIVE LAW 
280 (Tony Weir trans., 2d ed. 1987) (“Jury trials admittedly occur only in criminal 
cases in England today . . . .”); Neil Vidmar, A Historical and Comparative Perspective on 
the Common Law Jury, in WORLD JURY SYSTEMS 1, 3 (Neil Vidmar ed. 2000) (“[W]ith the 
exception of the United States and parts of Canada, the jury has been largely aban-
doned for civil cases . . . .”).  It is an interesting question how much of the United 
States’s outlier status is attributable to the Seventh Amendment and its state constitu-
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ally the sole exception.  Indeed, in some common law countries even 
the criminal jury is in rapid decline.  South Africa eliminated criminal 
as well as civil juries almost forty years ago, and it is noteworthy and 
surprising that there has been almost no move to reinstate even the 
criminal jury in post-apartheid South Africa.33  Even in those common 
law countries that do retain the criminal jury, such as Great Britain, 
Ireland, Canada, New Zealand, and Australia, the actual number of 
trials in which a jury sits is rapidly declining, with more and more of 
the business of criminal adjudication being allocated to magistrates’ 
courts in which there is generally no jury at all.34
When we look at the countries outside of the United States in 
which the jury is in decline, we see a commensurate decline—just as 
Bentham, Thayer, and Wigmore would have predicted—in the law of 
evidence as well.  In 1972 Rupert Cross, at the time the leading Eng-
lish authority on the law of evidence,35 announced in a debate about 
the Criminal Law Revision Committee that he was working for the day 
when his own subject would be abolished.36  In magistrates’ courts in 
England, Australia, and New Zealand it is the brave lawyer indeed who 
makes an evidentiary objection.37  The standard South African treatise 
on the law of evidence38 is a far sparser work than its American coun-
terparts, and even the rules that exist in South Africa are ever more 
tional counterparts and how much to the efforts of interest groups like the American 
Trial Lawyers Association. 
33 See Christopher Roederer, The Transformation of South African Private Law After 
Ten Years of Democracy:  The Role of Torts (Delict) in the Consolidation of Democracy, 37 
COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 447, 456 n.34 (2006) (noting abolition of criminal juries in 
South Africa); Tracy Gilstrap Weiss, Comment, The Great Democratizing Principle:  The 
Effect on South Africa of Planning a Democracy Without a Jury System, 11 TEMP. INT’L & 
COMP. L.J. 107, 122 (1997) (discussing lack of support in the South African legal 
community for reinstatement of juries). 
34 See, e.g., Neil Cameron et al., The New Zealand Jury, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., 
Spring 1999, at 103, 106 (1999) (documenting shift toward magistrate and district 
court trials in New Zealand); Kimberly Ann Page, The Sale of English Justice, 29 DENV. J. 
INT’L L. & POL’Y 1, 1-6 (2000) (lamenting increased use in the United Kingdom of 
nonjury courts for criminal trials). 
35 See RUPERT CROSS, EVIDENCE (5th ed. 1979); RUPERT CROSS, AN ATTEMPT TO 
UPDATE THE LAW OF EVIDENCE (1973); RUPERT CROSS & NANCY WILKINS, AN OUTLINE 
OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE (3d ed. 1971); J.D. HEYDON, CROSS ON EVIDENCE (6th Austl. 
ed. 2000); COLIN TAPPER, CROSS ON EVIDENCE (7th ed. 1990). 
36 The episode is described in TWINING, supra note 17, at 1.  Cross’s more nuanced 
and well-developed position is set out in Rupert Cross, The Evidence Report:  Sense or Non-
sense—A Very Wicked Animal Defends the 11th Report of the Criminal Law Revision Committee, 
1973 CRIM. L. REV. 329. 
37 TWINING, supra note 17, at 212. 
38 L.H. HOFFMAN, THE SOUTH AFRICAN LAW OF EVIDENCE (2d ed., 1970). 
SCHAUER PENNUMBRA.DOC 11/21/2006 3:57:21 PM 
174 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 155: 165 
 
rarely enforced in courts or taken seriously by judges.39  And the same 
trend can be found in Canada, Ireland, Australia, New Zealand, and 
much of the rest of the non-American common law world.40  The law 
of evidence does still exist in all of these increasingly, or entirely, jury-
free countries, but the widespread belief in such jurisdictions is that it 
exists substantially as a path-dependent relic of earlier days; something 
to be taken lightly at all times and ignored whenever possible.41
This view of the jury-dependence of evidence law is compatible 
with the state of affairs in the typically jury-free civil law world as well.  
In civil law countries, the jury is largely an alien institution, so it is not 
too much of an overstatement to say that the law of evidence simply 
never developed at all.42  There are, in civil law jurisdictions, various 
bits and pieces of evidentiary rules that resemble some of the common 
law rules of evidence, but the civil law neither has a systematic law of 
evidence nor, not surprisingly, does it have its Thayers or its Wigmores 
or its Morgans or its Crosses to explicate it.43  As a matter of historical 
and comparative fact, therefore, it is hard to deny that the existence of 
the jury has been a substantial (even if not exclusive) cause of the de-
39 I am grateful to Sir Richard Goldstone for discussion on this point. 
40 See, e.g., Khan v. The Queen, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 531, 548 (Can.) (recognizing an 
exception to the hearsay rule allowing evidence regarding a child’s statements regard-
ing a crime committed against the child, subject to consideration of “necessity and re-
liability”); Morris v. Cameron, [2006] 240 N.S.R.2d 123, para. 25 (Can.) (allowing in-
troduction of hearsay evidence that “does not fall under an existing hearsay exception” 
based on consideration of its “necesssity and reliability”); David M. Tanovich, Starr Gaz-
ing:  Looking into the Future of Hearsay in Canada, 28 QUEEN’S L.J. 371 (2003) (analyzing 
future impact of the relaxed, “necessity and reliability” approach to hearsay evidence 
adopted in Canadian courts). 
41 See Laird C. Kirkpatrick, Evidence Law in the Next Millennium, 49 HASTINGS L.J. 
363, 365 (1998) (“[A]fter England abolished the right to a jury trial in most civil cases, 
it then signif icantly expanded the admissibility of hearsay.”). 
42 See Kenneth Culp Davis, An Approach to the Rules of Evidence for Nonjury Cases, 50 
A.B.A. J. 723, 726 (1964) (urging the Anglo-American legal world to follow the Euro-
pean civil law tradition and largely eliminate those rules that eliminate the use of “evi-
dence that has probative force”); see also Damaska, supra note 14, at 343-48; Karl H. 
Kunert, Some Observations on the Origins and Structure of Evidence Under the Common Law 
System and the Civil Law System of “Free Proof” in the German Code of Civil Procedure, 16 
BUFF. L. REV. 122, 141-43 (1966); John H. Langbein, The German Advantage in Civil Pro-
cedure, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 823, 829 (1985) (noting the lack of a counterpart to Anglo-
American evidence law in Germany); M-L. Rassat, Forensic Expertise and the Law of Evi-
dence in France, in FORENSIC EXPERTISE AND THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 53, 53-57 ( J.F. Ni-
jboer et al. eds., 1993). 
43 See Mirjan Damaska, Evidentiary Barriers to Conviction and Two Models of Criminal 
Procedure:  A Comparative Study, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 506, 509 (1973) (noting, in regard to 
rules of evidence, that “there is so much highly complex law on the common law side 
and so little law on the civil law side”). 
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velopment (and to a significant extent the continuation) of anything 
resembling a comprehensive law of evidence.44
III.  THE ASCENDENCY OF FREE PROOF 
Against this historical and comparative background the views of so 
many contemporary American trial judges45 are not difficult to ex-
plain.  We know that the law of evidence, as a historical matter, arose 
to a significant extent because of the institution of the jury.  We know 
that there have been influential skeptics about the entire body of evi-
dence law for almost two centuries, and that defenders of evidence law 
against these skeptical attacks have relied largely on the alleged cogni-
tive, rational, and deliberative failings of juries.  We know that legal 
systems that have never had juries have never developed a compre-
hensive law of evidence.  And we know that legal systems that have 
seen the jury decline in importance have seen a commensurate de-
cline in importance in the law of evidence.  So, against this back-
ground, it is surely no surprise to discover that even in the United 
States, where the decline in the use of the jury has been the smallest, 
the immediate absence of a jury is taken by many trial judges as suffi-
cient cause to treat the law of evidence as somewhere between only 
mildly suggestive and largely irrelevant.  Nor is it a surprise to discover 
that in the United States, as elsewhere, there is an active call to discard 
the (intrinsic) formal rules of evidence in favor of something resem-
bling a Free Proof system when a jury is not part of the picture.46
This attitude is most apparent with respect to hearsay.  Putting 
aside criminal cases, where the exclusion of hearsay serves diverse 
purposes enshrined in the Sixth Amendment by the Confrontation 
44 Even those who see the existence of the jury as only one of the multiple causes 
of the development of the law of evidence, see DAMASKA, supra note 6, at 2-4 (suggest-
ing that the adversary system may be part of the root of evidence law); Langbein, supra 
note 5, at 1197 (tracing the source of evidentiary law to “the rise of adversary criminal 
procedure”), do not deny that the existence of the jury has been a signif icant con-
tributory factor.  Nor do they claim that the law of evidence in common law countries 
would be what it has become without the historical presence of the institution of the 
jury trial. 
45 And not-so-contemporary ones as well.  See Learned Hand, Address to the Asso-
ciation of the Bar of the City of New York:  The Def iciencies of Trials to Reach the 
Heart of the Matter (November 17, 1921), in LECTURES ON LEGAL TOPICS:  1921-22, at 
89, 98-99 (1926) (“Much of the delay and bickering which does more than deface a 
court room would be avoided by a recognition that the rules of evidence are practical 
and discretionary.”). 
46 See supra note 4. 
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Clause,47 the traditional operation of the hearsay rule ordinarily pro-
duces the exclusion of logically relevant and, thus, otherwise admissi-
ble and useful evidence.48  We can have greater confidence in the 
truth of what Jane told Sam, as recounted at trial by Sam in the ab-
sence of Jane, when we have Sam’s testimony than when we do not.  It 
is true, to be sure, that the opportunity to cross-examine Jane would 
increase the ability to test the truth of Jane’s statement,49 but the value 
of Jane’s statement as recounted by Sam even without the opportunity 
to cross-examine Jane is rarely zero.  To put it in Bayesian terms, we 
approach the question of the likely truth of some proposition with a 
prior probability of the truth of that proposition, and if we are then 
told by Sam that Jane affirmed that proposition, we would typically be-
lieve that the probability of the truth of that statement has risen by vir-
tue of even our second-hand knowledge of Jane’s endorsement of it, 
especially if there is reason to believe that Jane had actual knowledge, 
even if there is no opportunity to test Jane’s knowledge or the truth of 
her assertion by cross-examination, by observing her demeanor, or by 
putting her under oath.  Yet although Jane’s out-of-court statement 
thus ordinarily has between some and a considerable degree of proba-
tive value, such a prototypical hearsay statement would usually (and 
under the existing rules properly) be excluded,50 not because it is not 
probative, but despite the fact that it is probative, and very often 
highly so. 
There are, of course, numerous exceptions to the categorical ex-
clusion of hearsay.  The Federal Rules of Evidence list at least thirty,51 
47 See Davis v. Washington, 126 S. Ct. 2266 (2006); Crawford v. Washington, 541 
U.S. 36 (2004). 
48 “[T]he exclusion of hearsay . . . strikes at the root of the jury’s function by 
usurping its power to process quite ordinary evidence, the type of information rou-
tinely encountered by jurors in their everyday lives.”  Note, The Theoretical Foundation of 
the Hearsay Rules, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1786, 1805 (1980). 
49 See United States v. Evans, 216 F.3d 80, 85 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (“Cross-examination 
may be the ‘greatest legal engine ever invented for the discovery of truth’ . . . .” (quot-
ing California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 158 (1970))); Leake v. Hagert, 175 N.W.2d 675, 
683 (N.D. 1970) (noting that cross-examination reveals “the grounds of [a witness’s] 
assertion and his qualif ication to make it”); Roger Park, A Subject Matter Approach to 
Hearsay Reform, 86 MICH. L. REV. 51, 57 (1987) (“[One] justif ication for excluding 
hearsay depends upon the belief that a witness describing an out-of-court statement is 
likely to be less reliable than a witness describing nonverbal events, or at least that 
cross-examination will be less effective on a witness to a statement.”). 
50 See FED. R. EVID. 801(c), 802. 
51 The structure of Rules 801, 803, and 804 of the Federal Rules of Evidence 
makes an exact count diff icult.  Some of what were previously exceptions (party admis-
sions, most prominently) are now def ined as non-hearsay in Rule 801(d), see FED. R. 
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and then include the catchall Rule 807 just in case old ones were for-
gotten or new ones emerge.  Yet even though there are many excep-
tions, it would be a mistake to underestimate the force of the basic 
rule, which especially but by no means only in criminal trials, plainly 
excludes a substantial amount of otherwise relevant evidence.  And 
because hearsay evidence is so often obviously logically relevant, we 
can see the initial appeal of its formal elimination when a jury is not 
part of the picture, and we can see as well why it is ubiquitous that 
judges, magistrates, arbitrators, masters, and diverse other adjudica-
tors, when sitting without a jury, will typically but more informally al-
low hearsay evidence to be offered, announcing that such evidence 
will be given exactly the weight its intrinsic probative value deserves, 
presumably discounted for the epistemic losses coming from a non-
first-hand account, from the want of an oath, from the lack of an op-
portunity to cross-examine the declarant, and from the absence of the 
ability of the trier of fact to observe the declarant’s demeanor.  But 
implicit in current practice in nonjury settings in the United States 
and elsewhere is the fact that such a discount in epistemic value is 
never total, which is simply another way of saying that the evidence is 
admitted and given the weight that it is thought, in the final analysis 
and in the particular case, to deserve. 
A similar conclusion prevails with respect to the so-called best evi-
dence rule, more properly called the original documents rule.52  As 
with hearsay, the evidence excluded under strict application of the 
original documents rule is only infrequently irrelevant in the logical 
sense.  When presented with a copy of some document, even an un-
clear copy under somewhat suspicious circumstances, we rarely in or-
dinary life discount its epistemic value entirely.  Rather, we treat the 
possibility of miscopying or worse as a reason to discount the reliabil-
ity of the evidence.  This discounting rarely produces a probative value 
of zero, however, despite the fact that this is precisely what a strict ap-
EVID. 801(d) (identifying statements that are not hearsay), and many of the remaining 
exceptions set forth in Rules 803 and 804 have numerous parts, see FED. R. EVID. 803 
(providing extensive hearsay rule exceptions even when declarant is available as a wit-
ness); FED. R. EVID. 804 (listing hearsay exceptions when declarant is unavailable as a 
witness). 
52 See FED. R. EVID. 1001-1008.  The common law rule is well stated and applied in 
Sirico v. Cotto, 324 N.Y.S.2d 483, 486 (Civ. Ct. 1971).  See also Meyers v. United States, 
171 F.2d 800, 813 (D.C. Cir. 1948) (stating that the best evidence rule is more than a 
“legal cliché” and must be enforced). 
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plication of the original documents rule does in actual practice.53  But 
because the original documents rule tends towards the exclusion of 
otherwise useful evidence, it, like the hearsay rule, sees itself applied 
increasingly narrowly, and sees itself the subject of persistent calls for 
its elimination as well.54
Much the same can be said about the various forms of character 
and propensity evidence,55 about many of the exclusions of expert tes-
timony56 (even after the arguably limiting approach of Daubert v. 
Merrill-Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.57 and Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael 58), 
about some of the exclusions of opinion evidence,59 about a number 
53 I do not mean to ignore the extent to which the original documents rule—like 
the hearsay rule, the authentication requirements, and much else—has been weak-
ened in recent years, with much of this weakening now enshrined in the Federal Rules 
of Evidence.  See, e.g., Herzig v. Swift & Co., 146 F.2d 444, 445 (2d Cir. 1945) (Frank, J.) 
(“Perhaps the most to be said for the ‘best evidence rule’ is that it may serve on occa-
sion as a good mnemonic device.”); Kenneth S. Broun, Authentication and Contents of 
Writings, 1969 LAW & SOC. ORDER 611, 612-24 (assessing the effect of codif ication un-
der the Federal Rules of Evidence).  But because much of the impetus for this weaken-
ing is exactly what I challenge here, I will continue to focus on what remains, rather 
than on what has been relaxed or eliminated. 
54 See Herzig, 146 F.2d at 445 (questioning the value of the original documents 
rule); see also United States v. Winkle, 587 F.2d 705, 712 (5th Cir. 1979) (concluding 
that a plain violation of the best evidence rule was not grounds for reversal); Edward 
M. Cleary & John W. Strong, The Best Evidence Rule:  An Evaluation in Context, 51 IOWA 
L. REV. 825, 847-48 (1966) (concluding that the best evidence rule will diminish as the 
scope of discovery expands). 
55 See FED. R. EVID. 404-405; see also David P. Leonard, The Use of Character to Prove 
Conduct:  Rationality and Catharsis in the Law of Evidence, 58 U. COLO. L. REV. 1, 56-57 
(1987) (urging modif ication of existing rules so as to allow use of character evidence 
in civil cases); MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 5, § 4.15, at 193 (concluding that 
Rule 404(b) “adopts an inclusionary rather than exclusionary approach” to much evi-
dence of past acts and wrongs); Mirjan R. Damaska, Propensity Evidence in Continental 
Legal Systems, 70 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 55, 55 (1994) (suggesting that rules against charac-
ter evidence are problematic). 
56 See Tuf Racing Prods., Inc. v. Am. Suzuki Motor Corp., 223 F.3d 585, 591 (7th 
Cir. 2000) (holding that formal credentials are not necessary to qualify as expert wit-
ness); In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 35 F.3d 717, 741 (3d Cir. 1994) (noting that 
Rule 702 prescribes a “liberal” policy for the admission of expert testimony); Fox v. 
Dannenberg, 906 F.2d 1253, 1256 (8th Cir. 1990) (“[A]n individual can qualify as an 
expert . . . even though he may lack academic qualif ications in the particular f ield of 
expertise.”). 
57 509 U.S. 579, 585-95 (1993). 
58 526 U.S. 137, 147 (1999). 
59 See FED. R. EVID. 701; White v. Walker, 932 F.2d 1136, 1141 (5th Cir. 1991) (ex-
cluding lay opinion on child psychology).  Rule 701 is itself a liberalizing rule, as is 
recognized in, for example, Staley v. Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 106 F.3d 1504, 1513 
(10th Cir. 1997) (indicating that Rule 701 allows for “somewhat speculative” opinion). 
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of the requirements for authentication,60 about limitations on the use 
of demonstrative evidence,61 and about numerous other less impor-
tant exclusionary rules.  In all of these instances the evidentiary rule 
operates to exclude otherwise relevant evidence, and for almost all of 
these rules the exclusion is typically explicitly justified in terms of 
avoiding the risk of misleading the jury or of preventing the jury from 
mis-assessing the actual value of the evidence.62  Thus, as a conse-
quence of the assumed jury-dependence of this panoply of exclusion-
ary rules, we have seen that judges sitting without juries often treat 
these exclusions and related requirements as being, at best, hints (or 
rules of thumb) about how much weight to give the evidence, rather 
than as genuine rules demanding categorical exclusion.63  We have 
seen that proposals to codify or formalize this state of affairs surface 
with considerable frequency.  We have seen that the Federal Rules of 
Evidence have softened, compared to the situation existing at com-
mon law prior to enactment of the Rules, each of these rules of exclu-
sion.  And we have seen that the exclusionary rules are among the 
rules that no longer exist, or never existed in the first place, in juris-
60 See FED. R. EVID. 901.  Rules 902 and 903 both substantially liberalize the tradi-
tional authentication requirements.  FED. R. EVID. 902 (listing documents that do not 
need extrinsic evidence of authenticity for admission); FED. R. EVID. 903 (“The testi-
mony of a subscribing witness is not necessary to authenticate a writing unless required 
by laws of the jurisdiction . . . .”); see also United States v. Jimenez Lopez, 873 F.2d 769, 
772 (5th Cir. 1989) (emphasizing that the listed forms of authentication in Rule 901 
are not exclusive). 
61 See RICHARD O. LEMPERT ET AL., A MODERN APPROACH TO EVIDENCE 1146 (3d 
ed. 2000) (noting that “[s]ome courts do not distinguish between real and demonstra-
tive evidence”). 
62 See, e.g., United States v. Daniels, 770 F.2d 1111, 1116 (D.C. Cir. 1985) ( justify-
ing exclusion of character evidence by reference to “fear that juries will tend to give it 
excessive weight”); GOLDMAN, supra note 19, at 294 (observing that evidence can be 
both relevant and misleading); MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 5, § 9.32, at 1050 
(noting that demonstrative evidence may mislead juries); Richard D. Friedman, Mini-
mizing the Jury Over-Valuation Concern, 2003 MICH. ST. L. REV. 967, 967-68 (observing 
that the most common justif ication for excluding hearsay, character, and prior mis-
conduct evidence is the fear that juries will overvalue such evidence). 
63 To make clear what is implicit in my entire analysis, I do not consider totally 
transparent (to their background justif ications) rules of thumb (what some might call 
“guidelines”) to be variants of (real) rules.  See FREDERICK SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE 
RULES:  A PHILOSOPHICAL ANALYSIS OF RULE-BASED DECISION-MAKING IN LAW AND IN 
LIFE 104-11 (1991); Frederick Schauer, Exceptions, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 871, 893-98 
(1991).  As the presence of rules of thumb in the act-utilitarian canon indicates, CON-
TEMPORARY UTILITARIANISM, supra note 28, a rule that can be set aside whenever its 
background justif ications would indicate a contrary outcome is hardly a rule at all.  
And that is why the Free Proof tradition, my primary target here, is no less a nonrule 
tradition for its occasional employment of transparent or nonweighty heuristic rules. 
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dictions without juries or whose recent use of the jury has been con-
siderably diminished.  Taken together, therefore, it is hard to escape 
the conclusion that Bentham’s views are very much on the ascen-
dancy, that much of the entire law of evidence is in decline, and that 
arguments based on the Free Proof approach are close to winning the 
day. 
IV.  RULES AND THE RULES OF EVIDENCE 
The question whether judges sitting without a jury should discard 
or relax the rules of evidence64 can be seen as but one manifestation 
of a set of larger and deeper issues about the role of rules in decision 
making.  And one way of seeing this parallel is by imagining that the 
existing skepticism about the role of rules in epistemic decision mak-
ing—the skepticism of Bentham, Thayer, Wigmore, and many con-
temporary trial judges—were to be applied to normative or prescrip-
tive substantive legal rules.  As act-consequentialists have long insisted, 
numerous subsidiary rules are best seen as heuristics, or rules of 
thumb, whose ultimate goal is to help us make those all-things-
considered decisions that will maximize utility (or some other ulti-
mate value occupying a status equivalent to utility, but within a non-
utilitarian, although still consequentialist, framework).65  For the 
committed but sophisticated act-consequentialist, rules have their 
place, but the decision maker must discard the indications of those 
rules when, all things (including the value of having a rule) consid-
ered,66 following the rule will produce less utility (or whatever) than 
would be produced by a different decision.67
There are counterparts to this perspective within legal theory.  
Some of these counterparts are descriptive, and we associate many of 
the Legal Realists with the view that judges typically make what seem 
64 And thus also the question whether systems without juries should adopt rules of 
evidence, or develop more rules of evidence than they now have. 
65 See supra note 63.  Sophisticated act-utilitarianism is developed or discussed in 
many of the contributions in CONTEMPORARY UTILITARIANISM, supra note 28. 
66 There are connections between this position and the view of evidence expressed 
in Richard A. Posner, An Economic Approach to the Law of Evidence, 51 STAN. L. REV. 1477, 
1481-83 (1999). 
67 See Donald H. Regan, Authority and Value:  Reflections on Raz’s Morality of Free-
dom, 62 S. CAL. L. REV. 995, 1030 (1989) (“[I]f the authority is clearly in error, its direc-
tives are not binding.”); Donald H. Regan, Law’s Halo, in PHILOSOPHY AND LAW 15, 16-
25 ( Jules Coleman & Ellen Frankel Paul eds., 1987); J.J.C. Smart, Extreme and Restricted 
Utilitarianism, 6 PHIL. Q. 344, 348-49 (1956) (suggesting that it is illogical to obey a rule 
when breaking it would achieve a better result). 
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to them to be the best all-things-considered decision, using specific 
rules of law as after-the-fact rationalizations rather than as being genu-
inely decision motivating or decision guiding.68  And others are nor-
mative, seeing in accounts as diverse as those of Ronald Dworkin69 and 
Michael Moore70 the efforts to see legal rules not as legal ends in 
themselves, but instead as potentially transparent and defeasible indi-
cators of the larger and deeper goals that judges should strive to 
achieve, or of the larger and deeper rights that judges should seek to 
locate.71
68 The view that legal rules are deployed largely as ex post rationalizations for de-
cisions reached on other grounds (which grounds might well include decisions on the 
basis of other rules, including prescriptive rules about policy or justice that are not part 
of the law as such) is the central empirical claim of Legal Realism.  See JEROME FRANK, 
LAW AND THE MODERN MIND 130 (1930) (describing how a chief function of the law “is 
to enable the judges to give formal justif ications . . . of the conclusions at which they 
otherwise arrive”); K.N. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH:  SOME LECTURES ON LAW AND 
ITS STUDY (1930); Joseph C. Hutcheson, Jr., The Judgment Intuitive:  The Function of the 
“Hunch” in Judicial Decision, 14 CORNELL L.Q. 274, 278 (1929); Underhill Moore & 
Charles Callahan, Law and Learning Theory:  A Study in Legal Control, 53 YALE L.J. 1, 79 
(1943).  Although not all of Realism and not all of the writings of the major Realists f it 
this exact description, see WILLIAM TWINING, KARL LLEWELLYN AND THE REALIST 
MOVEMENT 169 (1973) (“[L]aw and justice had no need at all to be in conf lict or even 
in too much tension, but could instead represent a daily working harmony.” (quoting 
KARL LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION:  DECIDING APPEALS  513 (1960))), 
the lack of decision-determining power for legal rules remains a def ining characteris-
tic of Realism, see Brian Leiter, Legal Indeterminacy, 1 LEGAL THEORY 481 (1995); Brian 
Leiter, Legal Realism and Legal Positivism Reconsidered, 111 ETHICS 278 (2001); John 
Henry Schlegel, American Legal Realism and Empirical Social Science:  The Singular Case of 
Underhill Moore, 29 BUFF. L. REV. 195, 239 (1980); Charles M. Yablon, Justifying the 
Judge’s Hunch:  An Essay on Discretion, 41 HASTINGS L.J. 231, 236 (1990) (arguing that 
realists “denied that the actions of legal decisionmakers were the determinate results 
of applying general legal rules found in statutes or appellate cases”). 
69 See RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 15-20 (1986); RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING 
RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1977). 
70 See Michael S. Moore, The Interpretive Turn in Modern Theory:  A Turn for the 
Worse?, 41 STAN. L. REV. 871, 956 (1989) (“Anglo-American legal practice, which is 
largely interpretive, cannot be insulated from external questions.”); Michael S. Moore, 
A Natural Law Theory of Interpretation, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 277, 383-84 (1985) (claiming 
that even after a judge has looked at the “ordinary meaning” of a legal rule, she must 
then decide whether her initial “interpretation serves the purpose of the rule in ques-
tion”); Michael S. Moore, The Semantics of Judging, 54 S. CAL. L. REV. 151, 278 (1981) 
(stating that judges should not just look at laws in a “literal” sense, but look behind 
them, in light of their “ethical intuitions about what, in rules of this sort, the word 
ought to mean”). 
71 In fact, both Dworkin and Moore, albeit in slightly different ways, reach this re-
sult by indirection, arguing that there is a difference between the superf icial rule—the 
seeming meaning of the words of the rule formulation—and the deeper or “real” 
meaning of the rule itself.  DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE, supra note 69, at 16-17; Moore, 
The Semantics of Judging, supra note 70, at 278; see also David O. Brink, Legal Theory, Legal 
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The foregoing paragraph contains more than a bit of a caricature, 
but that is my basic point.  Neither the Realists (or at least most of 
them) nor Dworkin nor Moore believe that substantive legal rules do 
not comprise in important ways fixed points, such that a judge who 
thought of them as simply rules of thumb would remain faithful to the 
judicial office.  We expect judges to take substantive legal rules seri-
ously, largely because we see such rules as serving important functions 
in practical reasoning that would be poorly served were judges to see 
themselves as simply making what seemed to them to be the best all-
things-considered decision.  Indeed, even were that the goal, we have 
a healthy enough appreciation of the variability of views and values 
and talents among actual judges that we see legal rules as cabining 
some of this variation by holding judges to the rules of law even when 
those rules might generate morally, politically, or pragmatically 
suboptimal results.72
To the extent that any of this resonates with respect to the sub-
stantive rules of law in general, however, then it is at least arguable 
that it resonates pro tanto with respect to that set of procedural or 
epistemic rules that we label as the law of evidence.  If we think that 
normal substantive legal rules have a point other than as transparent 
heuristics, then we might well think that the rules of evidence also 
have a point, and not just as epistemic rules of thumb.  Many or most 
of the reasons that lead us to abjure the q’adi,73 or the unconstrained 
pragmatist, with respect to normative determinations should lead us 
to have largely commensurate worries with respect to factual ones.  
Wary of Platonic guardians, we impose on our judges more or less 
Interpretation, and Judicial Review, 17 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 105, 125 (1988) (arguing that we 
should see laws as “human artifacts” and thus look at the “reasons, purposes, and in-
tentions of those who enacted the law” in addition to the actual “meaning of the 
words”).  For present purposes, however, we can let this complication pass. 
72 On the larger distinction between rule-based and all-things-considered deci-
sions, see LARRY ALEXANDER & EMILY SHERWIN, THE RULE OF RULES:  MORALITY, 
RULES, AND THE DILEMMAS OF LAW (2001); FREDERICK SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE 
RULES, supra note 63, at 77-78. 
73 The reference here is to Max Weber’s (largely inaccurate, as a matter of Islamic 
law) characterization of the Islamic q’adi judge (which Weber spelled “khadi”) as the 
ultimate embodiment of discretionary and contextual decision making.  See MAX WE-
BER, LAW IN ECONOMY AND SOCIETY 351 (Max Rheinstein ed., Edward Shils & Max 
Rheinstein trans., 1967) (“[Khadi justice] decides cases . . . non-formalistically and in 
accordance with concrete ethical or other practical value-judgments.”); see also AN-
THONY T. KRONMAN, MAX WEBER 76-77 (1983) (describing Weber’s interpretation of 
so-called “khadi justice” as “adjudication of a purely ad hoc sort in which cases are de-
cided on an individual basis and in accordance with an indiscriminant mixture of le-
gal, ethical, emotional and political considerations”). 
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concrete substantive rules of law, but the worries about Platonic 
guardians hardly evaporate when we ask them to reach factual rather 
than normative conclusions.  And if this is so, then there are reasons 
to fear a Free Proof tradition that turn out to be not that much differ-
ent from the reasons to fear a Free Law74 tradition. 
As noted above,75 the issue bears some affinity with a plausible 
rule-consequentialist tradition dating back to John Stuart Mill, relying 
heavily on Henry Sidgwick, and having its best-known more-or-less 
modern embodiment in the later work of R.M. Hare.76  As David Ly-
ons has demonstrated, rule-consequentialism collapses into act-
consequentialism if we assume that the maker of the rule and follower 
of the rule are the same agent.77  But for Mill in chapter 5 of Utilitari-
anism, the argument for encouraging people to pursue justice as an 
end in itself resides in the possibility that pursuing justice will lead to 
greater utility than will encouraging ordinary people to pursue utility 
directly.78  Sidgwick expanded on these themes, in ways that attracted 
the epithet “Government House utilitarianism,”79 and Hare developed 
the idea further with his unfortunately labeled distinction between 
“archangels” and “proles.”80  But although the labels were unfortu-
nate, the idea is important, because it captures the insight that there 
are distinctions that can be understood and drawn by some people 
under some conditions that are not distinctions that other people can 
reasonably be expected to understand, internalize, and apply.81
The relevance of this tradition to our problem should now be ob-
vious.  For Bentham, Thayer, and Wigmore, for many of their con-
temporary academic followers, and for many members of the contem-
74 There is, of course, a tradition with just that name, see generally James E. Herget 
& Stephen Wallace, The German Free Law Movement as the Source of American Legal Real-
ism, 73 VA. L. REV. 399, 407-19 (1987), but I make no claim of any connections here. 
75 See supra note 28. 
76 For a more recent expression, see CONRAD D. JOHNSON, MORAL LEGISLATION:  
A LEGAL-POLITICAL MODEL FOR INDIRECT CONSEQUENTIALIST REASONING (1991); see 
also Larry Alexander, Pursuing the Good—Indirectly, 95 ETHICS 315, 318 (1985); R.B. 
Brandt, Fairness to Indirect Optimific Theories in Ethics, 98 ETHICS 341, 342 (1988). 
77 DAVID LYONS, FORMS AND LIMITS OF UTILITARIANISM (1965). 
78 Mill, supra note 28, at 300 (“[ J]ustice is a name for certain moral requirements, 
which, regarded collectively, stand higher in the scale of social utility, and are there-
fore of more paramount obligation, than any others . . . .”).
79 BERNARD WILLIAMS, The Point of View of the Universe:  Sidgwick and the Ambitions of 
Ethics, in MAKING SENSE OF HUMANITY AND OTHER PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS, 1982-1993 
at 153, 166 (1995). 
80 See supra note 28.
81 See Frederick Schauer, Slippery Slopes, 99 HARV. L. REV. 361, 380-81 (1985). 
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porary trial bench, judges are the archangels and jurors the proles.  
Rules are for other and weaker people.  Conversely, therefore, those 
who perceive themselves as possessing greater wisdom, training, and 
insight tend also to perceive themselves as having far less need for the 
rules that society often employs as second-best strategies in order that 
third-best decision makers will not persistently make fourth-best deci-
sions.  So when the proles are not part of the picture, Bentham and 
his successors appear to have believed, the reasons for rules are vastly 
diminished, and the archangels can make the best all-things-
considered epistemic decisions in much the same way as they might 
make the largely rule-free all-things-considered substantive and nor-
mative ones. 
I do not want to press the parallel too far, but the similarities are 
nonetheless suggestive.  And what the parallels most suggest is that the 
question of Free Proof, even though it is about facts and not about 
substantive prescriptions, is largely a question about rules, and about 
when it might be valuable to think of rules as decision-making devices 
that are designed for worse rather than for better decision makers.  
To the extent that we really do think that judges are simply better at 
many things than juries, it would follow that this might apply as much 
to factual determinations as to the question of how to resolve the dis-
putes and make the decisions that those facts raise.  But if we truly be-
lieved this, then we would have far fewer substantive legal rules than 
we actually now do have, and a far more casual (or “rule of thumb”) 
attitude towards the substantive rules that we have than is in fact the 
case.  Thus, our existing stock of substantive legal rules and our actual 
perspective on the force of those rules suggest that we believe that 
such rules serve a valuable function in, among other things, channel-
ing and constraining judicial decisions, reducing the variability among 
judges and their decisions, and adding important elements of predict-
ability and reliance to the legal and judicial processes. 
It remains possible that none of these considerations leading to 
the size and weight of our stock of prescriptive legal rules apply to fac-
tual determinations.  It is far more plausible to believe, however, that 
many of the same considerations apply to factual determinations as to 
normative ones.  There may well be differences, to be sure, but it ap-
pears likely that there are far more similarities between ordinary pre-
scriptive legal rules and the epistemic rules of evidence than most 
judges and most commentators have historically believed, and believe 
even now.  To the extent that this is so, the burden of proof shifts to 
the commentators and judges to show that the reasons for having le-
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gal rules in general do not apply when those rules shape and con-
strain the fact-finding process.82  And we have little reason to believe 
that this burden of proof has yet been carried. 
V.  ON THE RELATIVE CAPACITIES OF JUDGES AND JURIES 
There is occasional resistance in the literature to attributing much 
of the initial ascendancy and subsequent decline in the power of the 
exclusionary rules of evidence to the alleged cognitive deficiencies of 
jurors.  This resistance—criminal cases with constitutional dimensions 
aside83–-is typically some variation on the basic theme of “juries are 
not as dumb as you think they are,”84 often (and admirably) supported 
82 An important contemporary tradition in evidence scholarship urges rejection of 
the traditional atomistic/Bayesian/incremental approach to admission and exclusion 
of items of evidence in favor of a holistic and coherence-based approach, which is ar-
gued to be more compatible with the way in which people actually reason about facts.  
See, e.g., Ronald J. Allen, Factual Ambiguity and a Theory of Evidence, 88 NW. U. L. REV. 
604, 629 (1994) (“[E]ach decision is a unique function of the interaction of the par-
ties’ sense of ambiguity with the fact f inders’ understanding of it that remains rational 
notwithstanding each decision’s uniqueness and our inability to capture the decision 
process in a set of necessary and suff icient rules.”); Ronald J. Allen & Brian Leiter, 
Naturalized Epistemology and the Law of Evidence, 87 VA. L. REV. 1491, 1550 (2001) (criti-
cizing evidence scholarship for clinging to “[a] priori formalisms”); Michael S. Pardo, 
Comment, Judicial Proof, Evidence, and Pragmatic Meaning:  Toward Evidentiary Holism, 95 
NW. U. L. REV. 399, 440 (2000) (“The empirical and analytical work suggests a shift 
from this parataxic approach to a more holistic perspective.”); Dan Simon, A Third 
View of the Black Box:  Cognitive Coherence in Legal Decision Making, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 511, 
560-62 (2004) (suggesting that the “relative plausibility theory” is more consistent with 
human decision making than the Bayesian approach).  Such perspectives may well be 
sound, but it is less clear than some of their proponents appear to believe that they en-
tail acceptance of variants on the Free Proof idea.  See, e.g., Allen, Factual Ambiguity and 
a Theory of Evidence, supra, at 631 n.82 (indicating that a theory of Free Proof is “im-
plicit” in his holistic account).  Any holistic or coherence-based approach must distin-
guish between identifying the initial f ield of items on which the reasoning process is 
applied and specifying the method of reasoning that will be applied to that f ield.  Evi-
dentiary holism addresses the latter issue, but is in fact agnostic on the question of how 
the initial f ield is selected.  As a result, a rule-based approach to deciding what consti-
tutes the f ield is fully consistent with a holistic approach to what should be done with 
that f ield.  And as long as a rule-based f ield selection is compatible with a holistic 
method of reaching epistemic conclusions from that f ield, nothing about epistemic 
holism either presupposes or entails acceptance of Free Proof-like principles and rejec-
tion of exclusionary epistemic or evidentiary rules. 
83 The most noteworthy example being the constitutionalization of some aspects 
of the hearsay rule after Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 68 (2004). 
84 See, e.g., Friedman, supra note 62, at 985 (arguing that “the over-valuation con-
cern should [not] lead to exclusion of . . . evidence”); Bernard Grofman & Heathcote 
W. Wales, Modeling Juror Bias, 5 LEGAL THEORY 221, 224 n.10 (1999) (criticizing the 
existing exclusionary rules of evidence as based on “paternalistic notions about the 
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with some empirical (usually experimental) evidence.85  But although 
such arguments seek to shift the terms of the debate, they do not seek 
to alter the current trend in evidence law, for they support rather than 
resist the general movement in favor of greater admissibility. After all, 
if juries are less dumb than we thought they were, and if juror dumb-
ness is the primary basis for many of the traditional exclusions, then 
discovering that jurors are not so dumb supports the admission of 
previously excluded evidence and the relaxation of the traditional 
rules against hearsay, character, past acts, nonoriginal documents, and 
much else. 
Yet although we increasingly see the “juries are not as dumb as 
you think they are” argument for allowing lay jurors to hear what 
judges sitting without juries often take it upon themselves to hear, we 
still do not see much of the “judges are not as smart as they think they 
are” argument, an argument that, to the extent it is sound, suggests a 
quite different conclusion—that judges, rather than seeking to relax 
the rules of evidence for themselves, should instead impose on them-
selves (or have imposed upon them) many of the same rules of exclu-
sion that they routinely apply to the juries they manage and instruct.  
This latter argument sails directly into the prevailing winds of evi-
dence law, for rather than seeking to ameliorate the effects of the tra-
ditional exclusionary rules by relaxing those rules when juries do not 
competence of jurors to evaluate evidence”); Nance, supra note 16, at 229 (arguing 
that justif ication for exclusionary rules of evidence should not primarily focus on over-
blown “concerns about the irrational behavior of weak-minded lay jurors”); Richard D. 
Friedman, Anchors and Flotsam:  Is the Law of Evidence “Adrift”?, 107 YALE L.J. 1921, 1966-
67 (1998) (book review) (suggesting that justiciable exclusionary evidentiary rules are 
justif ied not by juror cognitive def iciencies but instead by conceptions of individual 
rights). 
85 See Dale A. Nance & Scott B. Morris, Juror Understanding of DNA Evidence:  An 
Empirical Assessment of Presentation Formats for Trace Evidence with a Relatively Small Ran-
dom-Match Probability, 34 J. LEGAL STUD. 395, 435 (2005) (concluding, after empirical 
study, that jurors “generally make reasonable use of complex material” (quoting Neil 
Vidmar & Shari S. Diamond, Juries and Expert Evidence, 66 BROOK. L. REV. 1121, 1166 
(2001))); Dale A. Nance & Scott B. Morris, An Empirical Assessment of Presentation For-
mats for Trace Evidence with a Relatively Large and Quantifiable Random Match Probability, 
42 JURIMETRICS J. 403, 444 (2002) (countering concerns that juries overvalue scientif ic 
evidence with research suggesting that juries actually tend to undervalue such evi-
dence).  For a summary of some of the social science evidence, much (but hardly all) 
of which supports the traditional skepticism about juries, see Ehud Guttel, Overcorrec-
tion, 93 GEO. L.J. 241, 253-60 (2004); Daniel A. Krauss & Bruce D. Sales, The Effects of 
Clinical and Scientific Expert Testimony on Juror Decision Making in Capital Sentencing, 7 
PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 267, 274 (2001). 
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sit, it seeks to strengthen those rules even when allegedly cognitively 
superior judges are sitting as the triers of fact.   
Although I put the issue in terms of “smart” and “dumb,” these 
words are only a rhetorical flourish.  The precise claim here is that 
even judges are often afflicted with the kinds of cognitive failings that 
juries are,86 and that many of the same reasons that exist for imposing 
second-order exclusionary (or other) rules on juries’ first order epis-
temological assessments also apply to the arguments for imposing sec-
ond-order rules on the first-order epistemological assessments of 
judges. 
This argument is best put forth as a hypothesis subject to further 
testing, for, as yet, we have only a limited stock of such tests.  What we 
know about jury behavior we know from experiments on mock (and 
occasionally real87) juries,88 or from laboratory experiments on ordi-
86 Cognitive failings include not only the failures of overvaluation, but also the 
failures of undervaluation.  See Nance & Morris, Juror Understanding, supra note 85, at 
397 (recognizing the risk that jurors might both overvalue and undervalue scientif ic 
evidence).  And although an exclusionary rule would be a bizarre remedy for the fail-
ing of undervaluation, the larger point is that even a failure of undervaluation might 
usefully be corrected by some sort of second-order rule whose existence and power 
would be in tension with the Free Proof tradition.  Even if that second-order rule is not 
an exclusionary one, it still might inf late (or decrease) the weight of admitted evi-
dence, or include that which would otherwise be excluded.  On inclusionary rules, see 
EDWARD W. CLEARY ET AL., MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 24, at 56-57 (3d ed. 1984) (dis-
tinguishing “wide-open” and “restrictive” rules regarding cross-examination); 
SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULES, supra note 63, at 91-92; Dale A. Nance, Verbal Com-
pleteness and Exclusionary Rules Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, 75 TEX. L. REV. 51, 52 
(1996) (describing the “rule of completeness” which “unlike almost all other admissi-
bility rules . . . is inclusionary”).  So even if the failings of jurors are sometimes not the 
failings of overvaluation, the real question is whether we have reason to believe that 
any of the cognitive failings we observe in jurors are signif icantly less present in judges.  
And if we do not have good reason to draw this distinction, then the larger issue, and 
the one discussed at length above in Part III, is whether there is justif ication for treat-
ing inquiry about facts as a substantially less rule-based affair than inquiry about the 
applicable norms. 
87 E.g., Shari Seidman Diamond et al., Revisiting the Unanimity Requirement:  The Be-
havior of the Non-Unanimous Civil Jury, 100 NW. U. L. REV. 201 (2006) (reporting study of 
actual juries in f ifty Arizona civil trials). 
88 E.g., Richard R. Izzet & Walter Leginski, Group Discussion and the Influence of De-
fendant Characteristics in a Simulated Jury Setting, 93 J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 271, 273-75 (1974) 
(describing a mock jury study using undergraduates in an introductory psychology 
course).  Comprehensive surveys include Guttel, supra note 85, at 253-60 (discussing 
experimental evidence that juries are often unable to ignore inadmissible evidence); 
Robert MacCoun, Inside the Black Box:  What Empirical Research Tells Us About Decision-
making by Civil Juries, in VERDICT:  ASSESSING THE CIVIL JURY SYSTEM 137 (Robert E. 
Litan ed., 1993) (evaluating various methods used to study juror decisionmaking in 
civil actions); Michael T. Nietzel et al., Juries:  The Current State of the Empirical Literature, 
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nary people (who are usually not so ordinary, but are instead college 
sophomores taking psychology courses89) that are typically extrapo-
lated to support claims about the kinds of ordinary people who wind 
up on juries.90  But implicit in the existing literature and its method-
ologies is the view that while such experimental subjects are more or 
less representative of the ordinary people who sit on juries, they are 
not at all representative of judges.  Nor is there a body of research di-
rected precisely at the methodological question of whether college 
sophomores are as representative of judges as fact finders as they are 
of the ordinary reasonable person91 as a fact finder.  In the same vein, 
we still wait for experiments holding constant the nature of the evi-
dence and manipulating (in the technical sense) the education, intel-
ligence, role, and training of the fact finder in order to determine 
whether what we know and assume about jurors might apply to judges 
as well.  And in the absence of such experimental empirical conclu-
sions, we assume that judges are less prone than juries to the cognitive 
and decision-making failures we worry about in jurors, possibly be-
cause judges are smarter, possibly because they are better educated, 
possibly because of their greater experience in hearing testimony and 
finding facts,92 and almost certainly because of their legal training and 
legal role-internalization.93
in PSYCHOLOGY AND LAW:  THE STATE OF THE DISCIPLINE 23 (Robert Roesch et al. eds., 
1999) (providing overview of learning on juror behavior derived from empirical re-
search); see also GOLDMAN, supra note 19, at 298-99 (describing study in which mock 
jurors watched a videotaped reenactment of a trial). 
89 Who Needs Real Managers When You’ve Got Fraternity Boys?, PSYCHOL. TODAY, Feb. 
1998, at 26, 26. 
90 See REID HASTIE ET AL., INSIDE THE JURY 38-41 (1983) (explaining benef its and 
disadvantages of using mock jurors in studies); Nancy Pennington & Reid Hastie, Prac-
tical Implications of Psychological Research on Juror and Jury Decision Making, 16 PERSONAL-
ITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 90, 94 (1990) (comparing studies using undergraduates 
against those using individuals from actual jury pools); Nancy Pennington & Reid 
Hastie, Juror Decision-Making Models:  The Generalization Gap, 89 PSYCHOL. BULL. 246, 
279-84 (1981) (evaluating methodologies for research on jury decision making).  An 
interesting example of the phenomenon is Fred E. Inbau, Lay Witness Identification of 
Handwriting (An Experiment), 34 ILL. L. REV. 433, 434 (1939), which used an experiment 
conducted on Northwestern University law professors to draw conclusions about the 
behavior of lay jurors. 
91 Or, as the English so quaintly put it, “the man on the Clapham omnibus.” E.g., 
McQuire v. W. Morning News Co., [1903] 2 K.B. 100, 109. 
92 And possibly because they are like us. 
93 See Gregory Mitchell, Mapping Evidence Law, 2003 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1065, 1122 
(differentiating the quality of decisions made by judges and juries by referencing the 
“repeat player” status of judges and the higher standard of accountability placed on 
them).  Kalven and Zeisel identif ied a divergence between the results reached by juries 
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In the absence of much empirical evidence, therefore, and with 
the hope that there will be more of just these kinds of experiments, a 
few observations are in order.  First is that the empirical evidence that 
does exist supports the “judges are not as smart as they think they are” 
view, although primarily in the context of the ability to disregard con-
stitutionally inadmissible evidence rather than in the more germane 
(here) context of overvaluing, or otherwise mis-assessing, actually 
probative evidence.94  In addition, although we may not know much 
about the actual cognitive abilities of judges as compared to juries, we 
do know quite a bit about the tendency of people, and especially pro-
fessionals, to overestimate their own cognitive abilities.  And what we 
know is not encouraging.  Consider, for example, the research on ac-
tuarial versus clinical decision making.95  In numerous contexts, in-
and the results on the same facts reached by judges in HARRY KALVEN, JR. & HANS 
ZEISEL WITH THOMAS CALLAHAN & PHILIP ENNIS, THE AMERICAN JURY 56 (1966) (f ind-
ing that judges and juries disagree 24.6% of the time), but their methodology may 
have overestimated the degree of divergence, and in any event does not allow a con-
clusion about whether the divergence was attributable to mistakes by juries or mistakes 
by judges.  See GOLDMAN, supra note 19, at 312 (noting that the Kalven and Zeisel study 
was limited to criminal cases and failed to identify how errors were distributed between 
judges and juries).  Indeed, because the judges were more inclined to convict in 
criminal cases than juries, one explanation is that judges were more inclined to go be-
yond the evidence and rely on their own beliefs about how the defendant wound up in 
the dock in the f irst place. 
94 Andrew J. Wistrich, Chris Guthrie & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Can Judges Ignore Inad-
missible Information?  The Difficulty of Deliberately Disregarding, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 1251, 
1330-31 (2005) (concluding that judges are frequently unable to ignore inadmissible 
information in making decisions); see also Chris Guthrie, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Andrew 
J. Wistrich, Inside the Judicial Mind, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 777, 821 (2001) (“Like the rest 
of us, [ judges] use heuristics that can produce systematic errors in judgment.”); Paul 
H. Robinson & Barbara A. Spellman, Sentencing Decisions:  Matching the Decisionmaker to 
the Decision Nature, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1124, 1138-43 (2005) (discussing differences 
and similarities between judge and jury fact-finding abilities). 
95 See, e.g., JOHN MONAHAN, PREDICTING VIOLENT BEHAVIOR:  AN ASSESSMENT OF 
CLINICAL TECHNIQUES 97 (1981) (claiming that studies have repeatedly shown actuar-
ial predictions to be superior to clinical predictions); Stephen D. Gottfredson, Statisti-
cal and Actuarial Considerations, in THE PREDICTION OF CRIMINAL VIOLENCE 71, 75 (Fer-
naud N. Dutile & Clem H. Foust eds., 1987) (arguing that statistical models tend to 
more accurately predict behavior than clinical judgments); N. Zoe Hilton & Janet L. 
Simmons, The Influence of Actuarial Risk Assessment in Clinical Judgments and Tribunal De-
cisions About Mentally Disordered Offenders in Maximum Security, 25 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 393, 
405 (2001) (recommending that actuarial assessments be substituted for clinical judg-
ments in decisions to release mentally ill offenders); Ann Ward & John Dockerill, The 
Predictive Accuracy of the Violent Offender Treatment Program Risk Assessment Scale, 26 CRIM. 
JUST. & BEHAV. 125, 136-37 (1999) (presenting advantages of an actuarial model for 
identifying violent offenders).  The opposing view, a decidedly minority one, is repre-
sented in, for example, Thomas R. Litwack, Actuarial Versus Clinical Assessments of Dan-
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cluding release from prison on parole, sentencing to probation rather 
than prison, release from institutions of those who have been civilly 
committed for reasons of risks of danger to themselves and others, 
and many more, it is important to be able to predict future danger-
ousness.  One way of doing this is actuarial, with the predictor asked 
to identify a small number of readily observable features whose pres-
ence has in the past been shown to be a non-spurious predictive factor 
with respect to future dangerousness.  And the other way is clinical, 
with trained professionals–-psychologists, psychiatrists, social workers, 
etc. —conducting face-to-face interviews and then making their best 
qualitative, all-things-considered judgment about future dangerous-
ness. 
When such comparisons are drawn, almost all of the existing re-
search indicates that actuarial assessments of dangerousness are typi-
cally superior to clinical assessments, and that one reason for this, al-
though not the only reason, is that professionals typically overestimate 
the power of their own professional skills, the reliability of their own 
judgments, and  the strength of their ability to assess a particular situa-
tion.96  If we can extrapolate from this and related research,97 we 
might have reason to believe that judges will typically overestimate 
their own ability to assess facts, their capacity to rise above the cogni-
tive failings of lesser mortals, and thus their own lack of need for the 
kinds of exclusions (or, in theory, inclusions or weight-increasers98) 
that are represented by many of the rules of evidence.99  So even if, for 
the sake of argument, we assume that judges are indeed better than 
juries at not overestimating the value of hearsay evidence, at recogniz-
gerousness, 7 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 409, 437-38 (2001) (arguing that actuarial mod-
els are not reliable enough to replace clinical assessments). 
96 See, e.g., Colin Camerer & Dan Lovallo, Overconfidence and Excess Entry:  An Ex-
perimental Approach, 89 AM. ECON. REV. 306, 311 (1999) (f inding that subjects generally 
overestimate their skills relative to their competitors’); Leilani Greening & Carla C. 
Chandler, Why It Can’t Happen to Me:  The Base Rate Matters, but Overestimating Skill Leads 
to Underestimating Risk, 27 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 760, 774 (1997) (f inding that most 
subjects believed that their skill levels were better than average); Markus Glaser, Tho-
mas Langer & Martin Weber, Overconf idence of Professionals and Lay Men:  Individ-
ual Differences Within and Between Tasks? 26 (Apr. 26, 2005) (unpublished manu-
script), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=712583 (concluding, after 
empirical study, that professionals tend to be overconf ident when compared with a 
control group of students). 
97 Some of the research is engagingly described and applied in JAMES SUROWIECKI, 
THE WISDOM OF CROWDS 31-36 (2004). 
98 See supra note 86. 
99 I assume, perhaps counterfactually, that judges are no more likely to over-assess 
their own abilities than are other professionals. 
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ing the risks of non-original documents, at taking alleged expertise 
with a grain of salt, at giving character and prior acts showing a pro-
pensity to commit some current act their proper weight, and so on, it 
appears that we also have reason to believe that the gap between ju-
rors and judges in this regard, even if it does exist, will be systemati-
cally over-assessed by the judges themselves. 
In addition, some of the cognitive failings that undergird the ex-
clusionary rules of evidence are ones that may well resist just the kind 
of corrections that judges believe they are able on the basis of their 
training and experience to make.  Although the first wave of heuristics 
and biases research—by Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky, most 
prominently, but followed by many others as well100—was focused on 
identification of the rationality deficits of decision makers, subsequent 
waves have also looked at the extent to which some of these mistakes 
can be completely or largely eliminated by simple awareness of the 
bias or by somewhat more extensive “re-education.”101  And so, al-
though the research indicates that awareness of the bias can eliminate 
some biases—most of the framing biases, for example—the same re-
search program also indicates that other biases are quite resistant to a 
range of awareness-based de-biasing techniques–-anchoring, for ex-
100 Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty:  Heuristics and 
Biases, in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY:  HEURISTICS AND BIASES 3 (Daniel Kahne-
man, Paul Slovic & Amos Tversky eds., 1982); see also SCOTT PLOUS, THE PSYCHOLOGY 
OF JUDGMENT AND DECISION MAKING (1993); CHOICES, VALUES, AND FRAMES (Daniel 
Kahneman & Amos Tversky eds., 2002); Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Heuristics and Biases in the 
Courts:  Ignorance or Adaptation, 79 OR. L. REV. 61, 102 (2000) (discussing the problem 
of “congnitive illusions” in legal decision making).  There is an emerging skeptical tra-
dition about this entire line of research, see, e.g., GERD GIGERENZER, CALCULATED 
RISKS:  HOW TO KNOW WHEN NUMBERS DECEIVE YOU (2002); Gerd Gigerenzer & 
Daniel G. Goldstein, Reasoning the Fast and Frugal Way:  Models of Bounded Rationality, 
103 PSYCHOL. REV. 650, 651 (1996) (advocating a theory of “bounded rationality” in-
stead of the “heuristics-and-biases view”); G. Gigerenzer, The Bounded Rationality of 
Probabilistic Mental Models, in RATIONALITY:  PSYCHOLOGICAL AND PHILOSOPHICAL PER-
SPECTIVES 284, 297-301 (K.I. Manktelow & D.E. Over eds., 1993) (challenging the no-
tion of an “overconf idence bias”); Gregory Mitchell, Why Law and Economics’ Perfect Ra-
tionality Should Not Be Traded for Behavioral Law and Economics’ Equal Incompetence, 91 
GEO. L.J. 67, 138-39 (2002) (concluding that behavioral scientists often make inaccu-
rate assumptions in their study of human judgment), but, because even the skeptical 
tradition values the use of rules and heuristics, the question of whether certain heuris-
tics are examples of rationality or irrationality is not especially germane to my argu-
ment here. 
101 See Guthrie et al., Inside the Judicial Mind, supra note 94, at 822-25 (explaining 
that judges could be taught to identify and address their congitive biases by consider-
ing more perspectives, limiting the use of heuristics, and avoiding specif ic cognitive 
illusions). 
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ample.102  As a result, not only will some of the cognitive problems that 
the rules of evidence are designed to guard against not be dramati-
cally different for judges and jurors,103 and not only will some of them 
resist the kind of awareness-based de-biasing that is implicit in the 
judge-juror distinction, but the same pathologies that lead judges to 
believe they are not subject to juror pathologies will lead those same 
judges to believe, often erroneously, that they are especially able, as a 
result of awareness, to eliminate what few biases they believe they 
have. 
Finally, it is not irrelevant that the judges who in a nonjury trial 
must determine the facts are the same ones who must make all of the 
legal rulings and all of the procedural rulings, and thus who must, in 
the final analysis, simply decide the case.  Although few are so naïve as 
to believe that jurors find facts without regard to the ultimate out-
come, one important Realist message is that even judges make their 
intermediate or nonultimate determinations with some awareness of 
how these determinations will affect their own view of who, at the end 
of the day, ought to win the case.104  Now of course this Realist claim is 
an empirical one,105 and it is possible that the claim is mistaken for 
many or even most judges.  But, insofar as the claim is sound—Karl 
102 See, e.g., Timothy Wilson et al., A New Look at Anchoring Effects:  Basic Anchoring 
and its Antecedents, 4 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.:  GEN. 387, 397 (1996) (revealing that 
study participants continued to exhibit anchoring, even when forewarned about an-
choring effects). 
103 See Jon D. Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously:  The Prob-
lem of Market Manipulation, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 630, 633 (1999) (observing that cognitive 
biases “are not limited to the uneducated or unintelligent, and . . . are not readily ca-
pable of being unlearned”). 
104 This perspective is central in much of the Realist canon.  See, e.g., FRANK, supra 
note 68, at 131 (indicating that a judge’s decision may be tailored to be consistent with 
his view of “the case before him”); Jerome Frank, Are Judges Human?  Part I:  The Effect 
on Legal Thinking of the Assumption that Judges Behave Like Human Beings, 80 U. PA. L. 
REV. 17, 47 (1931); Jerome Frank, Are Judges Human?  Part II:  As Through a Class Darkly, 
80 U. PA. L. REV. 233, 242 (1931); Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate 
Decision and the Rules and Canons About How Statutes Are To Be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 
395, 398 (1950) (noting that it “makes a tremendous difference” whether a court re-
sponds more strongly to its “sense of the type of situation” or its “sense of a particular 
controversy between particular litigants”); Max Radin, Statutory Interpretation, 43 HARV. 
L. REV. 863, 881 (1930).  On the potentially distorting effect of the pressure to decide 
the immediate case correctly, see Frederick Schauer, Do Cases Make Bad Law?, 73 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 883 (2006). 
105 See Brian Leiter, Legal Realism and Legal Positivism Reconsidered, 111 ETHICS 278, 
279 (2001) (“The real dispute between Realism and Positivism . . . exists at the empiri-
cal level . . . .”); Brian Leiter, Realism, Hard Positivism, and Conceptual Analysis, 4 LEGAL 
THEORY 533, 547 (1998) (same). 
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Llewellyn often focused on the power of the particular106 and Jerome 
Frank’s commitment to the inevitability of particularism was consid-
erably stronger still107—then the lesson is that potentially distorted in-
termediate rulings may increase as the decision-making responsibili-
ties about the admissibility of evidence and about the ultimate 
resolution of the case are merged.  If there is a reason for at times re-
quiring jurors to answer special interrogatories in addition to (or oc-
casionally instead of) delivering general verdicts, then that same rea-
son may caution against assuming that a judge in charge of all of the 
decisions in some case will make intermediate rulings undistorted by 
that judge’s view of the proper outcome for the case as a whole.108  
And insofar as that risk is real, then one way of understanding the oc-
casionally formal, rigid, and mechanical application of the rules of 
evidence is to encourage a separation of functions across, and at times 
even within, decision makers.  The judge who is required to enforce 
the rules of evidence on herself 109 is a judge who might in an ideal 
world be able to function simultaneously as, in Hare’s terms, archan-
gel and prole.110  This is the judge who can screen herself off from just 
the kinds of facts that might in a perfect world produce a more accu-
rate factual determination, but who in an imperfect or second-best 
world might make better decisions under circumstances in which 
there are things–-and relevant things at that–-that she simply does not 
know.  But whether real judges can act this way in practice—whether 
real judges can stop thinking about pink elephants–-is an empirical 
question whose answer is quite likely to be “rarely.” 
VI.  BUT WHICH  RULES? 
The conclusion of the foregoing analysis is simply stated:  there 
appears to be more justification for a rule-based approach to evidence 
106 TWINING, supra note 68, at 369 (suggesting that attention to “the actual and the 
particular” was essential to Llewellyn’s realism). 
107 See FRANK, supra note 68, at 101 (“Judicial judgments . . . are worked out back-
ward from conclusions . . . .”). 
108 See generally Edmund M. Morgan, A Brief History of Special Verdicts and Special In-
terrogatories, 32 YALE L.J. 575 (1923).  Perhaps the most famous special interrogatory 
case is the reversal of the conspiracy conviction of Dr. Benjamin Spock because the 
trial judge, in a criminal case, had impermissibly used special interrogatories as a way 
of avoiding the possibility of jury nullif ication.  United States v. Spock, 416 F.2d 165, 
180-91 (1st Cir. 1969). 
109 See generally Thomas C. Schelling, Enforcing Rules on Oneself, 1 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 
357 (1985). 
110 HARE, supra note 28, at 44-45. 
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than is accepted nowadays, and the idea of Free Proof may have more 
cognitive and epistemic disadvantages than Bentham thought almost 
two centuries ago and than Bentham’s numerous academic and judi-
cial followers seem to think now.111  But that the law of evidence 
should plausibly be a rule-based enterprise says nothing about what 
those rules should be.  More to the point, the conclusion that we 
should have (intrinsic as well as extrinsic) rules of evidence does not 
entail the conclusion that we should have the intrinsic rules of evi-
dence that we have now. 
Although the argument for a rules-based approach to evidence 
leaves open the question of what those rules should be, there is also a 
rule-based argument that those rules should be substantially the rules 
we happen to have now, warts and all.  Once we appreciate that a 
principal argument for rules derives from the advantages of having 
readily accessible and easily understandable indicators of deeper but 
harder-to-apply primary considerations, we can see that many of these 
advantages may well exist in an entire set of rules simply because of 
their existence.  The very existence of the full set of evidence rules we 
happen to possess breeds a familiarity that increases understanding, 
and has developed in such a way over time that the common law proc-
ess has served to remove many of the most obvious defects.  Thus, if a 
large part of the case for individual rules is that the mistakes conse-
quent from the under- and overinclusiveness of crude rules are some-
times fewer and less consequential than the mistakes that decidedly 
nonideal decision makers will make in the absence of rule-based guid-
111 Alex Stein also challenges the Free Proof tradition, but on grounds quite dif-
ferent from those advanced here.  Stein insightfully sees the rules of evidence as allo-
cating the risks of error as between the parties, but offers little other than a brief nod 
to transparency and separation of powers on why such a goal need be served by rules as 
opposed to case-by-case allocation.  STEIN, supra note 6, at 107-40; Alex Stein, The Re-
foundation of Evidence Law, 9 CAN. J.L. & JURISPRUDENCE 279, 285-86 (1996).  By con-
trast, the argument here rests primarily on the virtues of rules as rules in an epistemic 
context, independent of the substantive goals that such rules might serve.  Erica 
Beecher-Monas argues that a structured (rule-based) reasoning process for evidentiary 
determinations serves due process goals, and that judges should serve as gatekeepers 
for the jury.  Erica Beecher-Monas, Heuristics, Biases, and the Importance of Gatekeeping, 
2003 MICH. ST. L. REV. 987, 989-90.  She does not, however, address directly the ques-
tion of who should serve as the gatekeepers for the judges, although elsewhere she 
maintains, correctly in my view, that judges should use heuristics in making their own 
determinations about the admissibility of scientif ic evidence.  Erica Beecher-Monas, 
The Heuristics of Intellectual Due Process:  A Primer for Triers of Science, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
1563, 1589-90 (2000). 
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ance,112 then just this argument, at one higher remove, may suggest 
that the mistakes embedded in a distinctly non-ideal set of rules may 
turn out to be less than the mistakes that would come from empower-
ing some non-ideal group of rule makers to start anew, or from ex-
pecting some nonideal group of rule appliers to apply an array of 
newer rules with which they are much less familiar.  Or, to put it 
somewhat more directly, at times it is genuinely optimizing to leave 
well enough alone. 
Still, it may not be the case that the mistakes incorporated in the 
existing array of evidence rules—many of which are the function of 
hoary but mistaken psychological assumptions—are fewer in number 
and consequence than the mistakes that would come from creating a 
new and unfamiliar set of evidence rules, even after we have accepted 
the idea that the Free (or Free-er) Proof approach is flawed and that a 
rule-based understanding of evidence has much to commend it.  And 
although I cannot even sketch here the beginnings of what such a 
new, but still rule-based, approach to evidence—for judges and juries 
alike—would look like, providing a few examples may still be in order. 
The most obvious place to start is with the hearsay rule, because 
this is the rule, constitutional issues of confrontation in criminal cases 
aside,113 that is most under attack.  As discussed above in Part III, it is 
the rule perhaps most widely ignored by trial judges sitting without a 
jury, it is the stock example in the academic literature advocating the 
relaxation or elimination of many of the rules of evidence, it is often 
the subject of calls for dramatic constriction or elimination,114 and it 
112 See ALEXANDER & SHERWIN, supra note 72, at 53-95 (exploring the tension be-
tween the imperfection of rules and the hazard of an unbound decision maker); 
SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULES, supra note 63, at 100 (“[A] system . . . attains the 
benef its brought by rules only by relinquishing its aspirations for ideal decision-
making.”); Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards:  An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 
557, 586-96 (1992) (exploring the implications of overinclusiveness and underinclu-
siveness in determining the favorability of rules versus standards); Russell B. Korobkin, 
Behavioral Analysis and Legal Form:  Rules vs. Standards Revisited, 79 OR. L. REV. 23, 43 
(2000) (expressing a preference for rules when citizens and adjudicators are not both 
“relatively perceptive . . . and homogeneous”).  But see Frederick Schauer, The Conver-
gence of Rules and Standards, 2003 N.Z. L. REV. 303 (considering the possibility that rules 
and standards may converge over time, making the choice between them less conse-
quential). 
113 See supra note 47. 
114 See, e.g., Richard D. Friedman, Toward a Partial Economic, Game-Theoretic Analysis 
of Hearsay, 76 MINN. L. REV. 723, 724-25 (1992) (observing that criticisms of the hear-
say rule “will not . . . surprise anybody familiar with the evidentiary debate”); Park, su-
pra note 49, at 54 (arguing that the hearsay rule should be retained in criminal cases 
but substantially limited in civil litigation); Eleanor Swift, Abolishing the Hearsay Rule, 75 
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has, by statute, been significantly diminished in the United King-
dom.115  Yet despite this onslaught, there remain sound reasons to be-
lieve that the hearsay rule would desirably continue in a rule-based 
approach to the law of evidence.  Initially, all of the cognitive argu-
ments set out in Part V above would apply plainly to hearsay, such that 
we can expect there to be approximately as much reason to doubt a 
judicial weighing of the value of hearsay evidence as a jury weighing.  
And once we have put the likely fallacy of comparative juror cognitive 
incompetence to rest, the principal reason for rejecting a hearsay rule 
is eliminated as well.116  In addition, and perhaps more importantly, 
the hearsay rule serves an important evidence-generating function, or, 
to put it differently, an important best evidence—in the nontechnical 
sense of that term—role.117  By excluding hearsay evidence (subject to 
all of the usual qualifications, caveats, exemptions, and exceptions—
or at least many of them), the hearsay rule compels the parties to 
search for more rather than less direct accounts, and to locate and 
bring forward the most immediate and cross-examinable witnesses.118  
Although an exclusion of hearsay will exclude some relevant evidence, 
such an exclusion will also compel the production of some better evi-
dence, and it may well be that the aggregate value of the better evi-
CAL. L. REV. 495, 518-19 (1987) (advocating replacing the current hearsay rule in some 
circumstances with a requirement for “foundation witnesses” who testify as to the ori-
gin and reliability of the hearsay). 
115 Criminal Justice Act, 1988, c. 33 §§ 26-28 (Eng.); see also Evidence Act, 1995, 
pts. 3.1-3.2 (Austl.); Evidence Act, 1995, §§ 55-75 (N.S.W., Austl.). 
116 There are some empirical studies of jury evaluation of hearsay, but none di-
rectly addressed to the comparative question of judge-juror competence.  See, e.g., 
Margaret Bull Kovera et al., Jurors’ Perceptions of Eyewitness and Hearsay Evidence, 76 
MINN. L. REV. 703, 719 (1992) (observing that “juries rely more heavily on eyewitness 
testimony than hearsay testimony”); Peter Miene et al., Juror Decision Making and the 
Evaluation of Hearsay Evidence, 76 MINN. L. REV. 683, 699 (1992) (f inding that in a 
mock juror study, introducing hearsay to a case based on circumstantial evidence 
raised the conviction rate by four percent, and that the conviction rate in mock cases 
based on eyewitness testimony actually decreased when hearsay was introduced); Re-
gina A. Schuller, Expert Evidence and Hearsay:  The Influence of “Secondhand” Information 
on Jurors’ Decisions, 19 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 345, 357 (1995) (indicating that jurors ex-
posed to hearsay with limiting instructions reached similar verdicts to those exposed to 
the same information in admissible form). 
117 That many of the rules of evidence are better understood as attempts to gener-
ate the best available evidence is an insight that has been prominently pressed by Dale 
Nance.  See, e.g., Dale A. Nance, Conditional Probative Value and the Reconstruction of the 
Federal Rules of Evidence, 94 MICH. L. REV. 419 (1995); Dale A. Nance, Conditional Rele-
vance Reinterpreted, 70 B.U. L. REV. 447, 448 (1990); Nance, supra note 16, at 270-94. 
118 On the view that evidence is something produced and created, and not just 
there, see Mark Cooney, Evidence as Partisanship, 28 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 833, 834 (1994). 
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dence marginally developed will be greater than the aggregate loss of 
the relevant evidence marginally excluded. 
With respect to the connected issues of character and past acts, 
the analysis is different but the conclusions are much the same.  Here 
the weight of modern social science research suggests that the con-
cerns about overweighting are sound.119  And since much of the con-
ventional academic and judicial wisdom is that evidence of past acts, 
prior behavior, and pertinent character is indeed highly probative,120 
perhaps here, more than anywhere, do we need the exclusionary rules 
even more for the judges who have such a belief than for jurors, or, at 
the very least, no less.  Moreover, the same evidence-generating con-
siderations apply here as for hearsay, considerations that are agnostic 
as between jury and jury-free trials.  If the adjudicative system has 
good moral and epistemic reasons for preferring evidence closely tar-
geted to the particular act at issue,121 then the exclusion of evidence of 
past acts and general traits of character, even if relevant, will provide 
119 Some of the research is cited and discussed in Campbell v. Greer, 831 F.2d 700, 
707 (7th Cir. 1987); see also Joel Schrag & Suzanne Scotchmer, Crime and Prejudice:  The 
Use of Character Evidence in Criminal Trials, 10 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 319, 341 (1994) (argu-
ing that allowing character evidence can make the jury too punitive toward habitual 
criminals).  But see Susan Marlene Davies, Evidence of Character to Prove Conduct:  A Reas-
sessment of Relevancy, 27 CRIM. L. BULL. 504, 532 (1991) (“[T]he view that character evi-
dence in general is not probative of conduct can no longer draw support from the psy-
chological materials.”).  Much of the research is directed to exposing what in the 
literature is typically referred to as the “fundamental attribution error.”  See RICHARD 
NISBETT & LEE ROSS, HUMAN INFERENCE:  STRATEGIES AND SHORTCOMINGS OF SOCIAL 
JUDGMENT (1980) (def ining the fundamental attribution error as “the tendency to at-
tribute overt behaviors to corresponding personal dispositions, thereby underestimat-
ing the causal role of environmental inf luences”). 
120 See United States v. Daniels, 770 F.2d 1111, 1116 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (conceding 
that evidence of prior similar acts is not excluded because it is logically irrelevant); 
David P. Bryden & Roger C. Park, “Other Crimes” Evidence in Sex Offense Cases, 78 MINN. 
L. REV. 529, 571 (1994) (recognizing the probative value of evidence of a defendant’s 
history of sex crimes); H. Richard Uviller, Evidence of Character to Prove Conduct:  Illusion, 
Illogic, and Injustice in the Courtroom, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 845, 848-49, 882-85 (1982) (argu-
ing that evidence of prior similar acts can be highly probative under certain circum-
stances, and should be admitted); see also Boardman v. Dir. of Pub. Prosecutions, 
(1974) 3 All E.R. 887, 892-95 (H.L.) (substantially restricting the application of the 
“propensity rule,” which excluded evidence of prior similar incidents). 
121 See United States v. McCourt, 925 F.2d 1229, 1235-36 (9th Cir. 1991) (“Our sys-
tem of justice should not permit the trier of fact to infer that because someone was a 
bad guy once, he is likely to be a bad guy again.”); United States v. Mothershed, 859 
F.2d 85, 89 (8th Cir. 1988) (announcing that “[w]e do not convict people of crimes 
simply because of their propensities; we do so because of what they have actually 
done”); United States v. Hodges, 770 F.2d 1475, 1479 (9th Cir. 1985) (concluding that 
a defendant “must be tried for what he did, not for who he is”). 
SCHAUER PENNUMBRA.DOC 11/21/2006 3:57:21 PM 
198 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 155: 165 
 
the incentives for the parties to provide evidence more focused on the 
particular acts and events at issue in the trial. 
Similar conclusions might even apply to some aspects of the often-
scorned and increasingly narrow original documents rule.122  It is true 
that the rule in its traditional clothing imposes cumbersome require-
ments on the introduction of reliable secondary evidence,123 but there 
is little reason and no evidence to support the conclusion that judges 
and jurors differ with respect to the tendency to mis-evaluate secon-
dary evidence that carries a whiff of suspicion.  And there is no reason 
at all to believe that the presence or absence of a jury makes a differ-
ence with respect to the evidence-generating side.  So insofar as it is 
desirable to have actual documents rather than, say, oral descriptions 
of them, the rule seems well-designed to create the correct incentives 
for the parties to preserve and come forward with the best evidence 
conceivably available, at least with respect to writings. 
None of this is to say that there are not other evidentiary rules that 
we might well be rid of.  But in many cases the arguments for discard-
ing such rules apply to jury trials as well as judge-only trials, and thus 
even the rules we would and should jettison are rules that do not and 
should not depend on any comparative failures of juries vis-à-vis 
judges sitting alone.  But the larger point is even more direct.  Even if 
we reject the rule-based argument for keeping many of the rules we 
have just because we have them, a properly designed new set of evi-
dence rules124 would have little tolerance for distinguishing between 
judge and jury, and would consequently wind up preserving even for 
nonjury proceedings more of the traditionally jury-focused rules than 
the typical judge or the typical Free Proof proponent has traditionally 
acknowledged. 
122 See supra notes 52-54 and accompanying text. 
123 See Michael H. Graham, Evidence and Trial Advocacy:  The Original Writing (Best 
Evidence) Rule, 26 CRIM. L. BULL. 432, 435-38 (1990) (noting that the original docu-
ments rule prevents the admission of some witness testimony based on personal 
knowledge). 
124 Which would likely include new rules we do not now have.  For example, Rich-
ard McAdams has suggested to me in conversation that cognitive problems of conf ir-
matory bias–-seizing on evidence supporting one’s prior beliefs and ignoring evidence 
contradicting it—might suggest the necessity of substantially more rules about the order 
of presenting evidence than we now have. 
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CONCLUSION:  SOME OPERATIONAL POSSIBILITIES 
Thus there are important issues to be explored—many of them 
empirical—before we quickly assume that judges can transcend those 
perceived cognitive and decisional failings of jurors that inspired the 
law of evidence in the first place.  Moreover, if judges are, as often as 
jurors, subject to the kinds of decisional distortions that the exclu-
sionary rules of evidence are designed to reduce, judicial awareness of 
the issue may not help very much.  For even were judges to be fully 
aware of the problem of their own potential cognitive failings, and 
even were judges consequently to recognize the value of self-binding 
rules, it would likely remain the case that even the sophisticated judge 
recognizing the value of the self-binding rule would occasionally be-
lieve, sometimes correctly but sometimes erroneously, that this is the 
case in which the rule should not be applied, even taking into account 
the value of having the self-binding rule in the first place, and even 
taking into account the possibility of her own error in making this very 
assessment. 
If we believe that this possibility of largely uncorrectable judicial 
error may exist, and if we therefore believe that on an excess number 
of occasions judges will mistakenly believe that the decision before 
them is not one in which the rule, all things considered, should apply, 
then there appears to be some need for a mechanism of external en-
forcement.  But what form might such a mechanism of external en-
forcement take?  Not only is there a harmless error rule as to constitu-
tional issues in criminal cases,125 but there is also, and a fortiori, an 
obvious but less often discussed harmless error rule for civil cases and 
nonjury criminal cases in which erroneous evidentiary rulings do not 
present constitutional issues.126  That being the case, an important 
question is whether there remains any possible way in which trial 
125 See Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 23-24 (1967). 
126 See FED. R. EVID. 103(a) (requiring that “a substantial right of the party” be af-
fected for a claim of error to be preserved); see also Doty v. Sewall, 908 F.2d 1053, 1057 
(1st Cir. 1990) (noting that in civil cases, appellate courts need not review evidentiary 
decisions unless a “substantial right” of a party is affected).  Indeed, the attitude is even 
more deferential than suggested in the text, because some appellate courts have gone 
beyond the harmless error principle to create a presumption that judges sitting with-
out a jury have not relied on any erroneously received inadmissible evidence.  See Gov’t 
of Canal Zone v. Jimenez, 580 F.2d 897, 898 (5th Cir. 1978) (“Since appellant’s case 
was tried before a Judge, we do not have to determine whether this evidence was ad-
missible.”); United States v. Allstate Mortgage Corp., 507 F.2d 492, 494 (7th Cir. 1974) 
(“Absent a showing of substantial prejudice, the court, in a bench trial, is deemed to 
have considered only admissible and relevant material.”). 
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judges sitting without a jury could actually be forced to take the rules 
of evidence seriously, assuming now that it would be good for them to 
do so.  If evidentiary issues do not in general wind up in appellate 
courts—and that is why, as the “case” books make clear, evidence is 
not a subject well learned or well taught by the use of cases,127 even as-
suming the general wisdom of a focus on appellate cases as a form of 
law school instruction—then it appears as if the normal vehicle for the 
correction of trial error is disproportionately unavailable for eviden-
tiary issues.  Indeed, one way of describing the current state of affairs 
is in terms of trial judges ignoring the rules of evidence in nonjury 
cases precisely because they know they can get away with it.  Because 
the rules of evidence–-as opposed to the particularized techniques of 
epistemic evaluation–-impose second-order constraints on first-order 
epistemic judgments of admissibility, we might (or at least some of us 
might128) think that these are just the kinds of constraints that require 
external enforcers.  And if the most common mechanism of external 
enforcement—appellate review—is unavailable, is there any hope for 
changing the current state of affairs? 
One possibility, of course, is to change the current attitude of ap-
pellate courts about reviewing evidentiary rulings in noncriminal, 
non-constitutionally-implicated cases.  But this approach is, at best, a 
remote possibility, in part because of the textual entrenchment of the 
harmless evidentiary error rule in Rule 103(a) of the Federal Rules of 
Evidence and its state counterparts,129 and in part because we have no 
reason to believe that appellate courts are much interested in increas-
ing their workload in general, or in increasing the number of correct-
outcome cases that they will scrutinize closely.  The statutory issue 
aside, however, one might imagine that a change in the incentives 
created by the existing harmless evidentiary error rule could be effec-
tuated insofar as appellate courts, without much increasing their 
workload, were to adopt the common technique of low-probability 
high-penalty enforcement.130  If the occasional trial judge who ignored 
the rules of evidence were to be subject to judicial scolding (and 
127 See RICHARD O. LEMPERT ET AL., A MODERN APPROACH TO EVIDENCE:  TEXT, 
PROBLEMS, TRANSCRIPTS AND CASES, at ix (3d ed. 2000) (“This is not a casebook.”). 
128 See Frederick Schauer, Judicial Supremacy and the Modest Constitution, 92 CAL. L. 
REV. 1045, 156-59 (2004). 
129 And also in 28 U.S.C. § 2111 (2006). 
130 The technique is especially useful for so-called white collar crimes, including 
tax crimes, and that is why law enforcement authorities are frequently so concerned to 
maximize the publicity attached to such cases. 
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scoldings in appellate opinions are noticed, and likely have a substan-
tial in terrorem effect on the future behavior of both the scolded judge 
and other judges as well), or if evidentiary mistakes were thought rele-
vant to judicial promotion, for example, then it might well be that ap-
pellate courts now have at their disposal a moderately wide range of 
techniques for changing current behavior short of engaging in an ex-
tremely improbable course of reversing a large number of cases (most 
of which will have reached the right result) simply because of non-
outcome-changing evidentiary errors. 
In terms of larger issues of institutional design, there exist in vari-
ous decision-making domains mechanisms by which the fact-finding 
and decision-making functions are separated.  Obviously the institu-
tion of the jury partakes of some of this, but it would be a mistake to 
move too quickly from recognizing some of the very real failings of ju-
ries to the conclusion that the merger of fact finding and law applying 
(or judgment rendering) is not itself without significant flaws.  And 
this holds even more true with respect to the merger of the quite dif-
ferent tasks of determining admissibility and making a factual judg-
ment on the basis of the admitted facts.  Thus, and without getting 
into detail here, it may be possible to conceive of some number of in-
stitutional designs in which a significantly rule-based evidence-filtering 
process could maintain its rule-based features by separating that proc-
ess from the goals of determining what happened as a matter of fact 
and then ultimately determining the outcome of some dispute.  We 
see some of this in the process by which federal magistrates in search-
and-seizure and confession cases make factual determinations to 
screen even from the trial judge those items of relevant, but unconsti-
tutionally obtained, evidence that are best left out of the proceedings 
entirely.  And the increasing use of discovery magistrates is an exam-
ple of a process in which fact production is separated from fact find-
ing.131  We can imagine various other designs in which separate pro-
ceedings and separate adjudicators in essence prepare the record 
which will then be the basis for decision by someone else.  This is a 
common feature of various investigations outside of the formal legal 
process, in which corporate officials delegate an evidence-evaluating 
or fact-finding mission to others while retaining the power of final de-
cision for themselves.  Under such an approach the fact finders or evi-
131 See, e.g., Crown Life Ins. Co. v. Craig, 995 F.2d 1376, 1379 (7th Cir. 1993).  For 
some discussion of the idea, see Frank H. Easterbrook, Discovery as Abuse, 69 B.U. L. 
REV. 635, 639-40 (1989) (suggesting that such an arrangement is “unwise”). 
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dence evaluators would be somewhat more inclined to see epistemic 
rule following as part of the very point of their enterprise, and would 
consequently be less inclined to discard those rules than if they saw 
those rules as obstacles in the way of reaching a final decision. 
These possibilities are obviously remote in the short or intermedi-
ate term.  Still, recognizing them might open up a wide range of pos-
sibilities for significant procedural reform to embody the importance 
of constraining judges as well as juries by exclusionary rules of evi-
dence.  But because such extreme forms of change in the institutional 
design of the trial are so unlikely in the foreseeable future, I will leave 
exploration of them for another occasion.  At the moment, it is suffi-
cient to conclude that it is hardly self-evident that the practices of so 
many trial judges in assuming that the rules of evidence are for other 
and lesser people is as beyond reproach and beyond remedy as is cur-
rently believed.  More broadly, it is far from clear that the increasing 
academic and judicial momentum in favor of some form of Free Proof 
rests on solid empirical or conceptual foundations.  Factual inquiry no 
less than normative legal prescription is usefully assisted by rules that 
are taken seriously, a point systematically neglected by the Free Proof 
tradition.  That tradition, in the large as well as in some of its less am-
bitious manifestations, thus stands exposed of failing to explain why 
rules are important for law but not for facts, and of continuously 
clinging to a romantic image of the trial judge as a figure largely free 
of the cognitive failings we see and appreciate in lay jurors.  Until the 
Free Proof tradition can meet the burden of explaining why these two 
significant omissions of justification do not substantially undercut the 
whole Free Proof idea, there will remain a significant place in the law 
of evidence for real rules that impose real constraints on real judges.  
In law this should come as little surprise. 
 
